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This dissertation centers on research at the intersection of labor, public, and
urban economics. Chapter 1 details the role, process, and history of census tract
delineation prior to each Decennial Census, and investigates short- and long-run
implications of neighborhoods that receive further delineation, or become “split”.
Using a difference-in-differences empirical design, I exploit Decennial Censuses from
1980 to 2010 to find that “split” census tracts increase in their proportion of Black
residents and these effects persist decades. Further evidence suggests that the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program may play a role in concentrating residents
in areas with greater census tract delineation. These results suggest that census
tract delineation may play an important role in shaping neighborhood dynamics.
Chapter 2 focuses on the role urban racial inequality has in contributing to
economic inequality for Black residents. Using variation in census tract boundaries
to measure levels of urban racial separation, I find that tract-induced racial
separation negatively impacts Black individuals across both income and skill
distributions. Contributing factors include fewer local job opportunities in
predominantly Black neighborhoods, and increased commuting costs for those with
jobs. Further evidence suggests these increases in separation, in already
predominantly Black neighborhoods, reduce economic and geographic mobilities
into adulthood. These results have important implications for fostering equal
economic opportunity in areas of high racial separation.
Chapter 3 documents the changing landscape of enrollment and graduation in
higher education during the rapid expansion of the for-profit sector in the 2000s. I
construct a measure of institutional quality and show that institutions of the lowest
quality, primarily for-profit institutions, experienced the largest increases in
enrollment as well as large decreases in graduation rates. Decomposing these
changes in the lowest quality institutions suggests that aggregate graduation rates
decreased primarily as a result of the changing enrollment landscape across higher
education, while growth in aggregate rates of the highest quality institutions comes
from within institution changes. These results suggest that as enrollment in higher
education expands, schools become more selective in who they enroll, and may have
consequences for students attending lower quality institutions.
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Chapter 1
THE ROLE OF CENSUS TRACT BOUNDARIES
1 Introduction
In a majority of social science research, the census tract has long been the unit of
analysis when studying “neighborhoods” because of their relatively stable geographic
structure. For instance, economists often use census tracts to study neighborhood
characteristics (Card et al., 2008; Farrell and Lee, 2011; Galiani et al., 2015; Bayer
et al., 2016; Sharkey, 2016), create levels of racial separation (Cutler and Glaeser,
1997; Collins and Margo, 2000; Cutler et al., 2008; Ananat, 2011; Bayer and
McMillan, 2012; Owens, 2016), or to measure the causal impacts of neighborhoods
on various economic outcomes (Sharkey, 2016; Chetty et al., 2016; Chetty and
Hendren, 2018; Chetty et al., 2020). While the most common usage of census tracts
may be to distinguish geographically-stable neighborhoods, census tract boundaries
also function through important public policy channels.
The largest and longest-running federal program to encourage the creation of
affordable housing, the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), uses census tract
data in order to determine low-income, qualifying neighborhoods (Office of Policy
Development and Research, 2013). Historically, census tract boundaries have also
been used to establish election districts, precincts, and wards, which state and local
governments create for administering elections (U.S. Census Bureau, 1994). Because
of the potential implications census tract boundaries may have throughout cities,
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incentives to delineate strategically may arise. In preparation for the Decennial
Census, these boundaries are updated to accommodate population changes, and
little is known to what extent these boundary changes impact neighborhood racial
dynamics and economic opportunity.
In this paper, I exploit variation in census tract boundaries using two distinct
data sets to describe how neighborhood dynamics, in terms of racial composition,
have changed over both short- and long-run time horizons as neighborhoods
continue to urbanize. To evaluate short-run impacts on neighborhood composition, I
use annual data within the context of a difference-in-differences (DID) empirical
design surrounding the 2010 Decennial Census. Specifically, I examine the annual
racial composition of census tracts that split relative to those that don’t, before and
after the 2010 Decennial Census holding census tract boundaries fixed to their 2000
Decennial Census “envelopes”. Similarly, long-run estimations use an event study
approach with Decennial Census data from 1980 to 2010 to evaluate how census
tract envelope racial composition changes each decade upon further delineation. I
conclude by examining a potential mechanism through which census tract
delineation may impact the racial composition of the neighborhood – the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit.
Central to the analysis is the configuration and conditions under which census
tract boundaries change. When originally introduced and widely implemented for
the 1980 Decennial Census, a typical census tract would split prior to the Census if
the population surpassed 8,000 residents, and merge if residential population fell
below 1,200 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1994).1 Original census tracts of the 1970 and
1980 Decennial Censuses were intended to be relatively permanent statistical
subdivisions that delineated the entirety of the United States, while future
delineations were expected to fall predominantly within initial boundaries (U.S.
1These thresholds have not been updated since their introduction and continue to serve as a
general guideline.
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Census Bureau, 2008).2 These delineations often reflect geographical boundaries,
and were historically used to aid census enumerators in visually depicting
boundaries which enclosed their respective areas of data collection.3
The key identifying assumption in estimating causal impacts of census tract
delineation is that trends in neighborhood racial composition would have evolved in
the same way in neighborhoods that received additional census tract splits as they
would at non-split neighborhoods within the same city, absent census tract
boundary updating. Within this context, I provide evidence that there are no
observable racial differences between neighborhoods that split and those that don’t
prior to each Decennial Census. While my results lack evidence of differential
neighborhood racial compositions prior to boundary updates, or parallel pre-trends,
like all DID designs, I cannot directly tests for differences in pre-trends in
unobserved determinants of neighborhood racial composition.
The first key finding of the analysis is that relative to census tract envelopes that
don’t receive further delineation, “split” census tract envelopes have higher
proportions of black residents after the resulting Decennial Census boundary
updates, and these effects persist decades. In terms of short-run effects, I find that
2000 Decennial Census census tract envelopes that split in the 2010 Census
increased in their proportion of Black residents by 0.26 percentage points relative to
census tracts that did not split. At the same time, I find evidence that census tract
envelopes that were split reduced the proportion of white residents in the
neighborhood by 0.16 percentage points immediately following the 2010 Decennial
Census. Long-run estimates suggest these effects amplify over time: twenty years
beyond further census tract delineation results in the neighborhood proportion of
2This was intended to simplify and enhance the tracking process of data at the census tract-level
over time. Henceforth, I refer to census tracts originating in 1970 and 1980 as the census tract
envelope.
3There are cases of “special” census tracts where these guidelines are abandoned and populations
are much larger. For example, some census tracts that contain large college campuses can be
considered a special census tract due to the large populations within the neighborhood.
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Black residents increasing by 5.03 percentage points, while the proportion of white
residents decreased 1.65 percentage points.
In exploring the LIHTC Qualified Census Tract mechanism, I find evidence of a
concentration effect. My results suggest that low-income, qualifying census tracts
are 1.6 percentage points more likely to receive multiple LIHTC-funded housing
projects if the census tract envelope received further delineation in the 2010
Decennial Census, relative to similar low-income, qualifying census tracts that did
not split. Investigating heterogeneous impacts suggests that the probability of
multiple LIHTC-funded projects within a neighborhood increases by 0.6 percentage
points for each additional split within the census tract envelope. Lastly, I find
evidence that splits within low-income, qualifying neighborhoods temporarily
increases housing values while at the same time reduces neighborhood rental rates –
features that are likely explained by improvements to the neighborhood housing
stock and the designation of LIHTC income-restricted rental units, respectively.
The most innovative feature of this paper is the application of census tract
boundaries beyond their use of geographically stable neighborhoods. Rather than
only using census tracts as the neighborhood unit of analysis (e.g., Card et al.
(2008); Chetty and Hendren (2018); Chetty et al. (2020)), my empirical approach
moves us forward in evaluating how further delineation of these boundaries impacts
outcomes of interest. The program developed by Logan et al. (2014) allows me to
combine and distribute census tract boundaries and characteristics to various points
in time. Thus, I am able to create a consistent shell, or “envelope”, for studying the
economics of census tracts.
More broadly this paper contributes to a relatively new strand of literature
studying the economics of maps. Nagaraj and Stern (2020) provide a detailed
discussion of the significance of map making in directing and developing economic
activity dating back to the Middle Ages. Jubara et al. (2021) work with
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to-be-released National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS) census
block data dating back to 1980 boundaries to explore the history of racial
segregation and integration of the Black population in metropolitan Minnesota.
They find that overlaying historical racial covenants and Home Owners’ Loan
Corporation (HOLC) zones with census block data continues to leave persistently
low or high proportions of Black residents in targeted neighborhoods. In a
forthcoming paper, Aaronson et al. (Forthcoming) study the effects of the 1930s
HOLC “redlining” maps on the long-run trajectories of urban neighborhoods. The
authors find that the HOLC maps of the early 20th century had meaningful and
lasting effects on the racial development of urban neighborhoods through housing
availability and neighborhood disinvestment.
More narrowly defined this paper contributes to understanding the link between
census tract configuration and affordable housing options. To the extent that public
policy, such as the LIHTC Qualified Census Tracts program, rely on the delineation
of census tracts for determining qualified neighborhoods, several researchers discuss
that little to no work exists in evaluating the consequences of such policy (e.g.,
Hollar and Usowski (2007); Dawkins (2013); Tax Policy Center (2017); Scally et al.
(2018); Reid (2019)). This work serves to lay the foundation in establishing the role
census tracts play in determining neighborhood racial composition through the
LIHTC. I study whether further census tract boundary delineation influences the
probability that low-income, qualifying neighborhoods receive LIHTC funds, as well
as other housing market characteristics also likely to be influenced by the
development of LIHTC housing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background into
census tract formation, who determines boundaries, and public policy channels;
Section 3 describes the data sources and their implementations; Section 4 presents
the empirical analysis of studying census tract delineation; Section 5 investigates
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whether the LIHTC program is related to census tract delineation; Section 6
concludes.
2 History and Implementation of the Census Tract
In this section I develop the history and intuition for evaluating census tract
formation and boundary updates. I begin by formally discussing the historical
timeline of census tracts in the U.S. Next, I describe how census tracts evolve in
preparation for each Decennial Census, and provide a visual depiction of census
tract boundary updates. I conclude with a discussion of who maintains and
determines boundary delineation and potential channels through which the
delineation process may create separation.
2.1 History of the Census Tract
As written in the U.S. Const. art. I, § 2.:
“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers [...] The actual Enumeration shall be made within
three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States,
and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they
shall by Law direct.”
Accordingly, the first census was carried out by U.S. marshals in 1790, consisted of
six questions, and collected data on approximately 3.9 million people (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2002). One hundred years later, Dr. Walter Laidlaw, the Executive
Secretary of the New York City Census Committee, proposed that in order to study
neighborhoods meaningfully it was necessary to have population data smaller than
the borough or ward (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013). He argued these data collection
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areas should remain unchanged from census to census, and first referred to the
established areas in New York City as “sanitary districts” in 1906; however beyond
this, little progress would be made on the development of district-level data over the
following 20 years.4
In preparation for the 1940 Decennial Census, several other large cities adopted
the census tract as an official geographic unit for which data would be published.
Census tracts covered large urban environments and block number areas (BNAs)
covered several other suburban cities. In 1970 the number of BNAs increased and
criteria of BNAs were updated to match those of the census tract (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2013). By the 1990 Decennial Census, the entirety of the U.S. was
delineated in census tract and block number areas, and in 2000 the BNA concept
was retired in exchange for consistent census tract terminology. 2010 marked the
100th anniversary of the delineation of the first census tract boundaries in the
United States.
2.2 Definition of the Census Tract
Original census tracts of the 1970 and 1980 Decennial Censuses were intended to
be relatively permanent statistical subdivisions that delineated the entirety of the
United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 1994). As neighborhoods urbanized, and
populations grew, boundaries needed to adjust for accurate, timely, and sufficiently
small geographic detail in the data collection process by census enumerators. Rather
than newly configuring census tracts every Decennial Census, they instead split
from the pre-existing census tract envelopes of earlier Decennial Censuses (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2008). While small adjustments may be made to already existing
4Decennial Census committee members were skeptical of the use of the more detailed level data
relative to the level of preparation necessary for delineation and collection of smaller geographic
districts. For instance, in the 1930 Decennial Census, some cities developed additional committees to
aid in processing census tract-level data, but were unable to raise the necessary funds for publication
of the final tables.
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boundaries, this feature enhances the tracking of census tract geography over time.5
Standard census tracts are usually split beyond a residential population of 8,000
residents, and merged if resident population falls below 1,200.6 Figure 1 illustrates
the evolution of census tract boundaries since their featured adoption for the 1970
Decennial Census. These population thresholds have not been adjusted since their
widespread implementation of the 1970 and 1980 Decennial Censuses. So, while
neighborhoods have become more crowded over the last 50 years, boundary
delineations are usually accepted as long as they fall within the specified range.
2.3 Who Determines the Boundaries of Census Tracts?
The Participant Statistical Areas Program (PSAP) through the U.S. Department
of Commerce allows eligible participants to review, update, and delineate new
census tracts prior to the upcoming Decennial Census. Participants may consist of
any interested regional or local government entities, private organizations, and
individuals familiar with the area. U.S. Census Bureau (2008) encourages
participation for three primary reasons: (1) familiarity of local population changes
and settlement patterns, (2) familiarity with unincorporated and emerging
communities, and (3) resulting data to meet the needs of their communities.
Because of the familiarity local participants have in determining census delineated
places, the Census Bureau is able to meet many of the statistical and spatial needs
required of the agency. U.S. Census Bureau (2008) discusses how data tabulated to
these boundaries are used by local, state, and federal agencies and organizations for
planning and funding purposes, as well as the private sector, academia, and the
public.
Primary participants begin by agreeing to work with all interested parties so that
5These updates and small boundary corrections are allowed during intercensal population esti-
mates.
6Special census tracts may be created for large special land use areas without housing or popu-
lation (e.g., large public parks, forests, etc.) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008)
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Figure 1: Census Tract Boundary Changes
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013) This figure shows the evolution of census tract
envelope 1130 of Salt Lake County, Utah, and illustrates how census tracts are split
over time as the census tract becomes increasingly populated.
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the resulting plan accommodates the needs and interests of governments,
organizations, and individuals in the area.7 Participants choose which counties they
are interested in covering, and agree to review and update all Participant Statistical
Areas within the specified county(ies). A final plan for each county is submitted to
the Census Bureau where acceptable population criteria are verified.8 Beyond
approval from the Census Bureau, delineation files are inserted into the
Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) Database.
2.4 Census Tracts in Public Policy
While U.S. Census Bureau (2008) describes that state and local governments
may also use census tract geography in determining funding, the largest federal
program to do so is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Qualified Census
Tracts program. Hollar and Usowski (2007) document the legislative history and
methodology for designating and awarding LIHTC funds in qualified neighborhoods.
The Tax Relief Act of 1986 created the LIHTC program, and the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989 amended the program to include additional incentives for
rehabilitation and replacement of substandard rental housing in low-income areas,
known as Qualified Census Tracts (QCTs).
Standard QCTs consist of tracts that have 50 percent of households with incomes
below 60 percent of the Area Median Gross Income (AMGI), or have a poverty rate
of 25 percent or more (Office of Policy Development and Research, 2013).9 LIHTC
funds for these neighborhoods are awarded on a state population basis from the
Department of the Treasury, and distributed to housing developers through state
7U.S. Census Bureau (2008) strongly encourages soliciting input from non-governmental organi-
zations, academics, and interested individuals.
8Census tracts that fall outside of standard census tract guidelines must have appropriate docu-
mentation for the decision.
9Ellen and Horn (2018) discuss varying features of individual state Qualified Allocation Plans,
in addition to QCTs, that further encourage the development and rehabilitation of neighborhoods
that meet specified criteria.
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housing finance agencies. There is no federal oversight beyond initial distribution,
and housing agencies have a wide discretion in determining projects to award
credits. Tax credits that are not purposed within the state are returned and
redistributed for use in other areas. While changes in census tract boundaries
should have no effect on the allocation of tax credits each state receives, boundary
manipulation could enhance the number of LIHTC-funded affordable housing units
available within low-income or high-poverty areas, or both.
Census tracts are first ranked in terms of lowest-income and highest poverty
neighborhoods and second by their combined rank. The combined ranking
determines the level of priority in awarding LIHTC funds. Thus, QCT envelopes
potentially receive excessive funds through additional boundary delineation while
concentrating affordable housing in the lowest-income or highest poverty areas.
Several researchers suggest the use of census tracts in determining who receives
LIHTC funds provides incentives for concentrating affordable housing in low-income
or high-poverty areas (eg., Dawkins (2013); Tax Policy Center (2017); Fischer
(2018); Scally et al. (2018)). In fact Kennedy (2015), found that Texas was in
violation of locating LIHTC-funded affordable housing units in neighborhoods of
predominantly Black inner-city areas, and too few in predominantly white suburban
neighborhoods.
While this work is primarily interested in how census tracts function within
neighborhoods, historically census tract boundaries have also been used in
determining voting districts. The boundaries of election districts after the 1970
Decennial Census were often drawn independent of Census Bureau geography, and
relied on Census population counts. Because of the lengthy, and sometimes
impossible, process in matching the features of state-provided election maps to
features of Census Bureau geography, timely population counts were absent in
updating districts (U.S. Census Bureau, 1994). Thus, the Census Bureau created
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the Election Precinct Program for the 1980 Decennial Census whereby state officials
were instructed to delineate voting districts to coincide with sufficiently large
Census Bureau geography – census tracts.10 This ensured that the Census Bureau
would be able to deliver accurate and timely population data by the end of the first
quarter of the following year. As a result, incentives arise to potentially delineate
boundaries strategically such that the resulting districts reflect the goals of a
legislator, rather than a representative community.
3 Data Background and Usage
The data sets used in the analysis include census tract data from the
Longitudinal Tract Data Base (LTDB) and National Historical Geographic
Information System (NHGIS), as well as Low-Income Housing Tax Credit census
tract data from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). In this
section I describe each data set and individual sampling criteria in further detail
and place them into context of the analysis.
3.1 Longitudinal Tract Data Base
Long-run census tract-level data come from the Longitudinal Tract Data Base
(LTDB) (Logan et al., 2014), and allow researchers to construct a variety of data
that stem from full count and sample data in the 1980-2000 Decennial Censuses and
the 2008-2012 ACS 5-year data file. These census tract-level data include variables
on population, race, income, education, and workforce characteristics. The key
advantage in using the LTDB lies in its choice of census tract boundaries. Data sets
are available to reflect either longitudinally consistent boundaries fixed to a single
10At the end of the process, the Census Bureau returned all State-submitted maps to the States
for their use in the redistricting process. Because the Census Bureau produced the election precinct
tabulations as a special computer subfile, the data were not in any published report. Also of note,
the Census Bureau kept no copies of these maps and did not show the boundaries of precincts on
any 1980 census maps available to the public.(U.S. Census Bureau, 1994)
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point in time, or the use of temporally-dependent census tract boundaries.
Additionally, because the data are provided as raw population counts I am able to
construct the characteristic of interest through aggregation of count data, rather
than weighting proportions to fit within larger levels of aggregation.11 Using the
Historical Delineation Files available from U.S. Census Bureau (2011), I aggregate
the detailed raw census tract data up to the MSA in order to construct city-level
estimates of population counts.12 I restrict my analysis to urban MSAs defined as
having a resident population of at least 100,000 individuals. This results in 303
unique MSAs in 2010, the most recent period used in the analysis.
I also make use of another feature of the LTDB when implementing the main
DID empirical strategy. Logan et al. (2014) construct a program through the LTDB
that matches 2010 Decennial Census census tract boundaries within their 2000
Decennial Census envelopes. This allows me to examine the racial composition of
2000 Decennial Census envelopes that split relative to those that don’t, before and
after the 2010 Decennial Census. The program contains information on how many
splits occurred within the 2000 census tract boundaries and appropriately weights
mean, median, and proportion variables by their base.13
3.2 National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS)
Additional short-run census tract-level population data come from the NHGIS
available through IPUMS (Manson et al., 2019). The NHGIS provides access to
summary statistics and Geographic Information System (GIS) files for the Decennial
Censuses and other nationwide surveys at varying levels of geography. I make use of
11For example, I am able to construct census tract-level proportions using the raw census tract
data. I can also aggregate the raw data to higher levels of geography, such as the MSA-level, without
having to weight census tract proportions by their population, for instance.
12Census tracts are designed to fall entirely within counties, and counties fall entirely within MSA
boundaries. Thus, census tracts aggregate nicely within MSAs.
13For example, the base variable for median household income would be the total number of
households.
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the ACS 5-year data files from 2005 to 2018 aggregated to the census tract level in
my DID empirical analysis of census tract splits surrounding the 2010 Decennial
Census. Each 5-year file provides estimates of the average characteristics over the
relevant period, and I use these characteristics to reflect the midpoint in each ACS
5-year sample. For instance, the 2005-2009 ACS 5-year file characteristics reflect the
midpoint, 2007, in my analysis. Thus, my DID analysis uses data from midpoints
2007 to 2016 reflecting ACS 5-year data files from 2005-2009 to 2014-2018.
Variables of interest include the total population, white alone, and Black alone
populations, as well as median rent and housing prices.
I apply the LTDB conversion program discussed above to the NHGIS population
data in order to convert all data back to their 2000 Decennial Census envelopes, and
calculate proportions white, Black, median rent, and median housing value using
2000 census tract envelope boundaries. Thus, I have data centered at the midpoints
of ACS 5-year data files from 2007 to 2016, aggregated to match exact 2000
Decennial Census boundaries. The resulting sample consists of 456,926
envelope-year observations within the MSAs of interest.
3.3 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
HUD’s LIHTC database contains information on over 48,000 projects placed in
service between 1987 and 2019. Variables used in the analysis include whether there
exists multiple LIHTC-funded projects, the number of low-income restricted housing
units, and whether units are new construction or rehabilitated. Data are available
at the project level and aggregated to current census tract boundaries. I further
apply the boundary conversion program developed by Logan et al. (2014) to adjust
these characteristics to 2000 Decennial Census Boundaries. These data are merged
with NHGIS data from 2007-2016 to analyze the impact of census tract delineation
on the LIHTC characteristics of interest.
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4 Empirical Analysis: the Effect of Census Tract Delineation
I begin my empirical analysis by studying the impact that additional boundaries
have on the racial composition of census tract envelopes. The first section consists
of a dynamic difference-in-differences (DID) empirical design estimating short-run
impacts surrounding the 2010 Decennial Census. Then I present the main DID
results empirically establishing significant effects after the 2010 Census, as well as
heterogeneous impacts. I conclude by corroborating the results found in my
short-run analysis with an alternate data set investigating long-run impacts.
4.1 Dynamic Difference-in-Differences
In order to characterize the impact that census tract delineation has on the racial
composition of neighborhoods, I present a dynamic difference-in-differences analysis
using the 2010 Decennial Census. Specifically, I examine the racial composition of
2000 Decennial Census census tract envelopes that split relative to those that don’t,
before and after the 2010 Decennial Census, from 2007 to 2016. My estimating
equation of interest is:








itθ + εict (1)
where the dependent variable yict is either the percent white or Black in census tract
envelope i in city c at time t. The independent variable treatment equals 1 if the
census tract envelope receives further delineation in the 2010 Decennial Census. The
base year of analysis is 2009, the year before census tracts split. Additional controls
in xit include a quadratic function in population and city fixed effects. Standard
errors are robust and clustered at the 2000 census tract envelope level.
The coefficient of interest in Equation 1 is δt and indicates the percentage point
effect on the neighborhood racial composition in year t. The key assumption for
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The unit of analysis is the 2000 census tract envelope (N=456,926). Coefficients are estimated from
the regression specified in equation 1, and have been multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation.
Additional controls include a quadratic function in neighborhood population, city and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered to the census tract envelope level. Estimation
is restricted to 2000 census tract envelopes that have a neighborhood population of at least 2,000
residents and a city population of at least 100,000. This captures 88.7 percent of neighborhoods
covering 303 unique MSAs.
identification is that trends in neighborhood racial composition would have evolved
in the same way in neighborhoods that received additional census tract splits as
they would at non-split neighborhoods within the same city, absent census tract
boundary updating. An F-test of the null hypothesis that the pre-period coefficients
found in Figure 2 are jointly equal to zero fails to reject the null in both panels
(panel (a): F (2, 47, 187) = 1.46, p = 0.23; panel (b): F (2, 47, 187) = 2.10, p = 0.12).
While Figure 2 lacks evidence of differential neighborhood racial compositions prior
to boundary updates, or parallel pre-trends, like all DID designs, I cannot directly
test for differences in pre-trends in unobserved determinants of neighborhood racial
composition.
The evidence provided in Figure 2 suggests that census tract delineation impacts
the racial composition of neighborhoods immediately following the 2010 Census.
Relative to census tract envelopes that don’t split in the 2010 Decennial Census,
2000 Decennial Census envelopes that split increase in their proportion Black by
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0.09 percentage points immediately following the 2010 delineation process. The
effect on the envelope percent Black persists, and increases to 0.38 percentage points
by 2016. At the same time, relative to census tract envelopes that don’t split, 2000
Census envelopes that split decrease in their proportion white by 0.09 percentage
points immediately after 2010 boundary updates and continue to decrease to 0.11
percentage points by 2016. While this effect remains persistently negative over time,
standard errors are quite large beyond this first year. The traditional two period
DID analysis can be found in Table A.1.
To study heterogeneous impacts of census tract splits, I examine whether the
number of resulting census tracts within a 2000 Decennial Census census tract
envelope differentially affect the racial composition of the neighborhood. As the
number of resulting tracts increases within a given census tract envelope, there may
exist additional opportunities to concentrate subsidized housing. For instance, three
nested tracts resulting from the 2010 Decennial Census, within a 2000 Census
envelope, suggests there could be three distinct neighborhoods eligible, instead of a
single neighborhood in the case of a tract that doesn’t split. To study the
reduced-form impact of additional splits on neighborhood racial composition, I
estimate an altered specification of the DID analysis found above:
yict = γ0+γ1postt+γ2number of splitsi+γ3(postt×number of splitsi)+x′itθ+εict (2)
where the dependent variable yict is either the percent white or Black in census tract
envelope i in city c at time t, postt indicates whether y is measured after the 2010
Decennial Census, and number of splitsi indicates the number of resulting census
tracts in the 2010 Decennial Census nested within 2000 Decennial Census envelope
i. Additional controls in xit include a quadratic function in population, city fixed
effects, and a linear time trend. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
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2000 census tract envelope level.
Table 1: Heterogeneous Effects of Census Tract Splits on Neighborhood Composition
(1) (2)
% Black % White
Number of Splits -1.128*** 1.882***
(0.068) (0.080)




The unit of analysis is the 2000 census tract enve-
lope (N=456,922). Coefficients are estimated from
the regression specified in equation 2, and have
been multiplied by 100 for ease of interpretation.
Additional controls include a quadratic function in
neighborhood population, city fixed effects, and a
linear time trend. Standard errors are robust and
clustered to the census tract level. Estimation is
restricted to 2000 census tract envelopes that have
a neighborhood population of at least 2,000 resi-
dents and a city population of at least 100,000.
This captures 88.7 percent of neighborhoods cov-
ering 303 unique MSAs.
Table 1 presents the effects of the number of splits within a 2000 census tract
envelope on the racial composition of the neighborhood. Relative to census tract
envelopes that do not split in the 2010 Decennial Census, an additional census tract
within the 2000 Census envelope results in the neighborhood Black residency
increasing by 0.042 percentage points. Conditional on an 2000 Census envelope
splitting, the average number of resulting 2010 census tracts nested within are 2.58
(std. dev.=1). Again, while insignificant, the coefficient of interest differs in sign
when comparing proportions Black and white in census tract envelopes.
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4.2 Event Study Approach
Similar to the analysis above, this section estimates the long-run impact of
boundary updates using the census tract envelope approach with envelopes now
fixed to their original boundaries. Using decadal data from the Longitudinal Tract
Data Base (LTDB) and an event study design, I corroborate the evidence found in
Section 4.1.
If available, census tract envelopes are based upon the original configuration,
when a majority of census tracts were delineated for urban areas.14 Otherwise, the
envelope is defined as the first time a new census tract appears, and is not
encompassed within an envelope already.15 Additionally, the event study exercise
accounts for multiple splits of the same census tract envelope.16 In event time, this
exercise captures 30 years prior to 30 years after a census tract splits. For instance,
a census tract envelope that existed in 1980, but did not split until 2010 would be
reflected in the relative year -30. Alternatively, a census tract envelope that was
split in 1980, and observed in 2010 would be reflected as 30 years after the event.
Because census tracts that were first split in the 1980 Decennial Census appear
more frequently in the data while those that were split in later Censuses appear less,
the final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 38,242 census tract envelopes
within the MSAs of interest.
I adopt a two-way fixed-effects (TWFE) specification to estimate the long-run
14New census tracts falling within the original envelope are tagged with the number of the original
envelope and appended with a decimal. To aggregate data to their original envelopes, I drop decimal
points and collapse data to the original census tract envelope number.
15For example, as cities expanded, the Census Bureau had to further delineate this growth. This
occurred up to the 1980 Decennial Census, where the Census Bureau expanded census tracts to
cover the entire U.S.
16This occurs in the most dense areas of cities.
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impacts of boundary delineation. My estimating equation of interest is:








itθ + εict (3)
where the dependent variable yict is either the percent white or Black in census tract
envelope i in city c at time t, and αi and αt are census tract envelope and time fixed
effects respectively. The independent variable treatment equals 1 if census tract
envelope i receives further delineation in year t. The base year of analysis is
k = −10, the observed period before the census tract is split, and is thus omitted.
Additional controls in xit include a quadratic function in neighborhood population
and city fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the census tract
envelope level.
The coefficient of interest is γk and indicates the percentage point effect on the
neighborhood racial composition in relative year k. Similar to the DID analysis
above, the key identifying assumption is that census tracts would have continued to
evolve in the same way if they had not received further boundary delineation in the
following Decennial Censuses. While I cannot test this assumption directly, an
F-test of the null hypothesis that the pre-period coefficients are jointly equal to zero
fails to reject the null in both panels
(panel (a): F (2, 2, 758) = 0.01, p = 0.99; panel (b): F (2, 2, 758) = 1.16, p = 0.31).
Figure 3 presents the results of the event study analysis.
The evidence found in Figure 3 supports the results found in the short-run
analysis of Figure 2. Results suggest that census tract boundary delineation
significantly impacts the racial composition of neighborhoods, and effects not only
persist decades but amplify over time. Panel (a) finds that ten years after a
neighborhood receives further delineation, the proportion of Black residents
increases 3.20 percentage points, and further increases to 5.03 percentage points
twenty years after the census tract envelope is “split”, off a sample mean of 9.29
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The unit of analysis is the original census tract envelope (N=38,242). Coefficients are estimated
from the regression specified in equation 3. Additional controls include a quadratic function in
neighborhood population and city fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered to the cen-
sus tract envelope level. Estimation is restricted to census tract envelopes that have a neighborhood
population of at least 1,200 residents.
percent. Alternatively, ten years after the neighborhood is “split” the proportion of
white residents decreases by 1.09 percentage points, and continues to decline thirty
years after delineation. Summarized results of this exercise can be found in Table
A.2
5 Mechanism Analysis: Investigating the LIHTC
The goal of this section is to consider whether federally subsidized low-income,
affordable housing plays a significant role in contributing to neighborhood racial
inequality through census tract delineation. While census tract boundaries are used
by varying state, local, and private agencies to direct public policy, the largest
federal program to do so is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Qualified
Census Tracts program. To explore this mechanism, I merge tract-aggregated
LIHTC data available through the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) with census tract data used earlier in the analysis to study whether census
tract “splits” affect the probability of neighborhoods receiving LIHTC projects, and
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their associated housing characteristics. Specific outcomes of interest include
heterogeneous impacts of census tract “splits”, designated low-income restricted
housing units, whether units are more likely to be rehabilitated or newly
constructed, and neighborhood rents and housing prices.
I begin by examining whether low-income, qualified neighborhoods that receive
further delineation are more or less likely to receive LIHTC-funded housing projects
and how the number of resulting tracts impacts this probability. I estimate a
variant of Equation 1 where the dependent variable is replaced with an indicator if
the 2000 census tract envelope received an LIHTC-funded project. Next, I examine
the probability of the census tract envelope receiving LIHTC funds by the number
of splits within the tract envelope. To study these heterogeneous impacts, I adopt











where y is an indicator if census tract envelope i received LIHTC funds, post
indicates that time t is after the 2010 Decennial Census, and number of splits
indicates the number of times census tract envelope i received additional
boundaries. Additional controls in xit include a quadratic function in neighborhood
population and city fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the
2000 census tract envelope level. This specification allows me to test whether there
exists differential impacts for census tract envelopes that are split once relative to
envelopes with multiple divisions.17 Thus, the coefficient of interest is γs and
indicates the percentage point effect on the probability that a low-income, qualified
17My sample consists of census tract envelopes that consist of up to 12 nested census tracts after
the 2010 Decennial Census, but I limit the presentation of results in this exercise to envelopes that
have 6 or fewer nested 2010 census tracts due to small sample sizes. Those with 6 splits or less make
up over 99 percent of the analysis sample.
23






















































2 3 4 5 6+
Number of Splits
(b) Probability by number of splits
The unit of analysis is the 2000 census tract envelope and is conditional on the envelope being a
low-income, qualified neighborhood from 2007 to 2016 (N=71,708). Coefficients are estimated from
regressions specified in Equations 1 (Panel (a)) and 4 (Panel (b)). Additional controls include a
quadratic function in neighborhood population, city fixed effects, and a linear time trend. The
dependent variable of interest in each panel is an indicator that equals 1 if the census tract envelope
received more than 1 LIHTC-funded project. Standard errors are robust and clustered to the census
tract level.
neighborhood receives multiple LIHTC-funded projects.
The results in Figure 4 suggest that census tract delineation impacts the
probability that neighborhoods receive multiple LIHTC-funded projects. Relative to
census tract envelopes that don’t split, 2000 qualified census tract envelopes that
receive further delineation are more likely to receive multiple LIHTC-funded
projects. Five years after the 2010 Decennial Census, the probability of multiple
LIHTC projects within a qualified census tract envelope increases by almost 3
percentage points, off a sample mean of 64.32 percent. Panel (b) presents the
heterogeneous impacts of census tract splits estimated from Equation 4, and
suggests that increasing the number of resulting tracts within a 2000 qualified
census tract envelope increases the probability of multiple LIHTC-funded projects.
A 2000 tract envelope that is further delineated into six or more resulting census
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tracts after the 2010 Decennial Census increases the probability of multiple
LIHTC-funded projects by more than 5 percentage points. Summarized results of
Figure 4 can be found in Table A.3.
Next I turn my attention to more detailed characteristics of LIHTC-funded
projects, as well as associated housing market characteristics including rent and
housing prices. I use a similar econometric framework as in Equation 1 where the
dependent variable is replaced with the LIHTC outcome of interest and the analysis
is restricted to low-income qualifying neighborhoods. The work of Dillman et al.
(2017) suggests that LIHTC-funded properties within low-income neighborhoods
may improve the surrounding the property values by removing blight and vacant
lots in exchange for affordable housing options within distressed neighborhoods.
The results found in Figure 5 support their findings.
Figure 5 suggests that census tract delineation is also related to characteristics
associated with LIHTC-funded projects. While not significant at conventional
levels, low-income census tract envelopes receiving further delineation are more
likely to contain housing classified as low-income restricted units, and further
housing market evidence supports this finding – neighborhoods that receive further
delineation experience modest rent declines relative to tract envelopes that remain
intact. Additionally, while further delineated neighborhoods are more likely to
experience the rehabilitation of existing housing units, these improvements appear
to also temporarily improve local housing values in low-income neighborhoods.
6 Conclusion
Census tracts are most often applied in research to construct geographically
stable neighborhoods, but a lesser known feature of census tract geography is their
role in public policy. The largest and longest-running federal program to encourage
the creation of affordable housing, the LIHTC, uses census tract data in order to
25














































































































































The unit of analysis is the 2000 census tract envelope and is conditional on the envelope being a low-
income, qualified neighborhood from 2007 to 2016 (N=71,708). Coefficients are estimated from the
regression specified in Equation 1. Additional controls include a quadratic function in neighborhood
population, city fixed effects, and a linear time trend. Low-income restricted housing units refer to
units designated as separate living quarters and restricted to individuals below an income threshold
determined by the state Housing Finance Agency (HFA). Rehabilitation is an indicator that equals
1 if the tract envelope received LIHTC-funded work to rehabilitate existing housing units rather
than to build new structures. Median rent and home value are in 2010 dollars. Standard errors are
robust and clustered to the census tract level.
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determine low-income, qualifying neighborhoods. Because of the potential
implications census tract boundaries may have throughout cities on affordable
housing options, incentives to delineate strategically may arise.
In this paper, I exploit variation in census tract boundaries to describe how
neighborhood dynamics, in terms of racial composition, have changed over both
short- and long-run time horizons. To evaluate short-run impacts, I use a
difference-in-differences empirical design surrounding the 2010 Decennial Census.
Specifically, I compare the annual racial composition of census tracts that split
relative to those that don’t, before and after the 2010 Decennial Census holding
census tract boundaries fixed to their 2000 Decennial Census “envelopes”. I further
corroborate my results within the short-run analysis using an alternative data set
spanning 1980 to 2010 to capture long-run impacts. Lastly, I provide evidence that
census tract delineation may yield such results through the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credit by concentrating affordable housing in disadvantaged neighborhoods.
My first key result suggests that census tract boundaries are delineated in ways
that concentrate Black residents in neighborhoods with additional census tract
splits. Common trends analysis suggests this can not be explained by observable
differences prior to the 2010 Decennial Census. Further analysis using long-run
data, I find that these effects persist decades and amplify over time – twenty years
beyond census tract delineation results in the neighborhood proportion of Black
residents increasing 5.03 percentage points, off a pre-treatment sample mean of 9.29
percent. I further provide evidence that the LIHTC may play a role in
concentrating Black residents in neighborhoods with more tract boundaries.
Conditional on low-income, qualifying neighborhoods, 2000 census tract envelopes
are 1.6 percentage points more likely to receive multiple projects relative to
neighborhoods that did not receive further delineation.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to consider the impacts that census tract
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delineation may have on the development and dynamics of urbanizing
neighborhoods. A significant literature has documented the disparities and
inequalities that result from unequal access to opportunity across neighborhoods,
and this paper explores a new channel that may contribute to increasing
neighborhood inequality. To the extent that public policy, such as the LIHTC
program, relies on the delineation of census tracts in determining qualified
neighborhoods, little work exists in evaluating the consequences of such criteria.
Future work should continue to explore avenues in which neighborhood boundaries
may influence the composition and direction of public policy.
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Chapter 2
SPLITTING TRACTS: THE IMPACT OF NEIGHBORHOOD RACIAL
DYNAMICS ON ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
1 Introduction
While the United States is the most diverse it’s ever been, urban America
continues to be racially and economically divided. Almost half of all Black families
in the U.S. live in a neighborhood without a white presence, and the average white
family lives in a neighborhood that is nearly 80 percent white (Abedin et al., 2017).
This racial inequality holds a longstanding position as one of the prime components
contributing to economic inequality for Black residents. A well established literature
has attempted to measure the impacts of racial separation on economic outcomes
for minority residents (e.g., Cutler and Glaeser (1997); Collins and Margo (2000);
Cutler et al. (2008); Ananat (2011); Bayer and McMillan (2012); Owens (2016));
however, less attention has been placed on developing channels through which racial
separation reduces economic opportunity.
This paper makes three contributions to this literature. First, using a novel
identification strategy, I estimate the heterogeneous effects of racial separation on
economic opportunities for minority residents spanning 30 years from 1980 to 2010.
My strategy leverages variation in census tract boundaries resulting from the 1980
to 2010 Decennial Census boundary updates to measure changes in cumulative
levels of urban racial separation. Specifically, I use this variation, conditional on
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population characteristics, as an instrument to estimate the effects of racial
separation on educational, labor market, and social opportunities.1 Second, using
newly available data from Opportunity Insights, I test two hypotheses as potential
explanations into why neighborhood racial composition plays an important role in
shaping the opportunities residents enjoy: (1) labor market attachment and (2) peer
influences. I conclude by examining the impacts tract-induced racial separation has
on the ability to leave predominnantly Black neighborhoods into adulthood.
Using an instrumental variables (IV) strategy to estimate the impacts of racial
separation on economic outcomes requires two conditions to be met. The first
requires that the instrument be related to racial separation, or the relevancy
condition. Why should we expect census tract delineation to be related to levels of
urban racial separation? Census tract boundaries often reflect visible features of the
landscape, and were historically used to aid census enumerators in visually depicting
boundaries which enclosed their respective areas of data collection (U.S. Census
Bureau, 1994). Thus, similar to analyses found in Hoxby (2000) and Ananat (2011),
census tract boundaries reflect natural geographic barriers that serve as a technology
for creating racial separation. That is, as populations grow and neighborhoods
become increasingly space-constrained, new residents expand by “falling back” to
the next natural geographic boundary, like a major roadway, railroad track, or tree
line – also reflected and updated through additional census tract delineation.2
The second condtion for a valid instrument requires the instrument to affect the
outcomes of interest only through the endogenous variable, or the exclusion
restriction. In measuring the impacts of racial separation, the exclusion restiction
requires that census tracts are designed, and split, orthogonal to observable, as well
1The measure of racial separation I use is defined as the Index of Dissimilarity. This statistic
indicates the proportion of the specified population that would have to relocate in order to create
an equal distribution within the city.
2Ananat (2011) provides a detailed discussion of railroad delineation as a technology for racial
separation. This approach generalizes technology for creating racial separation to any geographic
boundary reflected through census tract delineation.
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as unobservable, characteristics that may influence one’s economic opportunities.
While this assumption cannot be tested directly, I provide a falsification test that
suggests the first-stage relationship is not driven by some unobservable
characteristic also linked to racial separation that may influence economic outcomes.
To conduct this falsification exercise, I rely on a unique feature of census tract
delineation. Upon their widespread implementation, census tracts of the 1970 and
1980 Decennial Censuses were intended to be relatively permanent statistical
subdivisions delineating the entirety of the United States, while future delineations
were expected to fall predominantly within initial boundaries (U.S. Census Bureau,
2008).3 Using this “envelope” feature, the falsification exercise holds neighborhoods
fixed to their original census tract boundaries and tests for a relationship between
contemporaneous census tracts in a city and the measure of racial separation
calculated using the outer, or original, “envelopes”. The intuition behind this test is
as follows: If additional census tract delineation is related to racial separation and
the measure of racial separation is calculated using a fixed number of census tract
envelopes, then there should be no correlation between the number of
contemporaneous census tracts and the envelope-fixed racial separation index over
time.4 In fact, my results suggest there exists no relationship between these two
variables.
The first set of key findings suggests that increased racial separation negatively
impacts Black residents in terms of educational attainment, earnings, idleness in the
labor market, and single parenthood. A one percentage point increase in racial
3This was intended to simplify and enhance the tracking process of data at the census tract-
level over time. A typical census tract would split prior to the Census if the population surpassed
8,000 residents, and merge if residential population fell below 1,200 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1994).
These thresholds have not been updated since their introduction and continue to serve as a general
guideline. Henceforth, I refer to census tracts originating in 1970 and 1980 as the census tract
envelope.
4Alternatively, if a relationship did exist within this framework, it could be argued that the
number of census tracts instead reflect some unobservable characteristic that also induces racial
separation, rather than the boundaries themselves.
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separation reduces the probability a Black young person (ages 20-30) earns more
than median income in the national income distribution by 0.12 percentage points.
In terms of moving out of extreme poverty, an increase in racial separation, reduces
the probability a Black individual moves beyond the first income decile by 0.26
percentage points relative to a non-Black individual. Additionally, a one percentage
point increase in racial separation reduces the probabilities that a Black resident
completes high school or college by 0.16 and 0.60 percentage points, respectively.
Estimating the differential impacts for non-Black residents suggests little to no
improvements in terms of educational and labor market outcomes – estimates are
generally insignificant and an order of magnitude smaller than Black estimates in
absolute value. Given the average difference between high and low racially
separated cities in 2010 was 20.3 percentage points, these estimates indicate large
reductions in economic opportunities for Black residents, and little to no benefit of
racial separation for non-Black residents.5
Next, I examine potential causes and consequences of census tract-induced racial
separation. To explore mechanisms behind the negative impacts Black residents
face, I focus on two hypotheses: The first tests for weakened labor market
attachment among Black residents. I provide evidence that not only are there more
high paying job opportunities in non-Black neighborhoods, but more job
opportunities in general. Further, conditional on having a job, Black residents
usually work fewer hours per week. Attributable are longer commute times, and
heavier reliance on public transportation in more racially separated cities relative to
non-Black residents. The second hypothesis tests that Blacks have worse outcomes
in more racially separated neighborhoods because they have less contact with
positive peer influences. My evidence suggests in predominantly Black
neighborhoods there are fewer interactions with educated individuals and higher
5High racially separated cities are cities with a racial separation index greater than the mean.
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likelihoods of incomplete families.
I conclude by examining the impact census tract-induced racial separation has on
the ability to leave predominantly Black neighborhoods into adulthood. I find that
a one percentage point increase in racial separation increases the proportion
remaining in a predominantly Black childhood neighborhood into adulthood by
0.044 percentage points. This same increase reduces the proportion of individuals
who move from a predominantly Black neighborhood in childhood to a
neighborhood of affluence into adulthood by 0.245 percentage points relative to
individuals who grew up in more integrated neighborhoods.6
Most broadly, this paper contributes to a large literature on the effects of racial
or ethnic separation on economic outcomes (e.g., Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Card
et al., 2008; Cutler et al., 2008; Bayer and McMillan, 2012; Owens, 2016; Böhlmark
and Willén, 2020). Seminal work by Cutler and Glaeser (1997) provide evidence of
significant negative relationships between racial separation and economic outcomes
for Black residents, as well as positive impacts for non-Black residents. Using data
from the 1940 and 1950 Decennial Censuses, Collins and Margo (2000) find a
reversed relationship for Black residents. Edin et al. (2003) and Cutler et al. (2008)
empirically demonstrate there exists benefits for immigrants in ethnically
concentrated areas. In contrast, my results suggest there are little-to-no benefits to
separation for either minority or majority residents. I find there are large negative
impacts on economic outcomes for Black residents in heavily racially separated
cities, as well as no statistically significant impacts on labor market outcomes and
small positive impacts on college-going rates for non-Black residents.
More narrowly focused, this paper contributes to understanding the link between
urban racial separation and economic outcomes. The literature often focuses on the
ways in which racial separation within schools, or within neighborhoods of limited
6A neighborhood of affluence is defined as a census tract in which the poverty rate is less than
10 percent in adulthood.
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schooling lead to worse outcomes later in life. The work of Card and Rothstein
(2007) and Hanushek et al. (2009) both find that the Black-white test score gap is
higher in more racially separated cities and provide evidence that this gap is driven
by neighborhood racial separation, rather than separation within schools
themselves. Alternatively, Guryan (2004) finds that racial integration plans during
the 1970s account for about half of the decline in dropout rates of Black students,
and evidence suggests this may be driven through peer effects. Cutler and Glaeser
(1997) deviate from this literature by instead focusing on transportation factors and
peer influences in more racially separated cities. Additionally, Boustan and Margo
(2009) examine whether employment decentralization isolated Black residents from
work opportunities through the U.S. Postal Service. Using newly available data
from Opportunity Insights, I not only causally test these mechanisms, but include
more generally, labor market factors, a more robust channel of peer influences, and
consequences for geographic mobility. Overall, my work provides strong empirical
evidence of these mechanisms at play in contributing to economic inequality
between races.7
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data
sources and their implementations; Section 3 formally introduces and discusses the
measure of racial separation, as well as empirical evidence of a relationship with
census tract delineation; Section 4 presents the main results and heterogeneous
effects of census tract-induced racial separation. Section 5 explores different
mechanism hypotheses and implications; Section 6 concludes.
7A recent discussion of these factors contributing to racial inequality is available
in the New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/11/opinion/coronavirus-us-cities-
inequality.html#click=https://t.co/nHFRil2tZe
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2 Data Background and Usage
The datasets used in the analysis include individual data from the Decennial
Censuses and American Community Survey (ACS), census tract data from the
Longitudinal Tract Data Base (LTDB), and further-detailed census tract data from
Opportunity Insights. In this section I describe each dataset and individual
sampling criteria in further detail and place them into context of the analysis.
2.1 Decennial Census and American Community Survey Individual Data
Individual data used in the analysis come from the 1980 1% Decennial Census
sample, 1990 1% Decennial Census sample, 2000 5% Decennial Census sample, and
the 2010 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) sample available through
IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2019). To place my results in context with the literature
(e.g., Cutler and Glaeser, 1997; Collins and Margo, 2000; Cutler et al., 2008), I limit
my analysis to individuals ages 20 to 30, not incarcerated or institutionalized,
exclude those born in a foreign country, and limit to those individuals who list one
race or ethnicity: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, Asian, and
Native American.8 Additionally, I focus on individuals that list a Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) as place of residence. Reasons for such restrictions include
that theories of sorting most readily apply to young people in large urban areas, and
issues of differential mobility patterns are minimized when focusing on people who
have had the least amount of time to choose their place of residence (Cutler and
Glaeser, 1997). Bayer et al. (2014) validate this idea empirically by showing the
effects of sorting are reduced as individuals age because they become increasingly
mobilized in choosing a location to live. The resulting main analysis sample consists
of 1,592,503 observations in 1,019 MSAs over 40 years, spanning 1980 to 2010.9
8Hispanic refers to individuals who identify as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or other Hispanic,
and excludes those who list their race as white.
9All subsequent analyses are limited to these MSAs.
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Statistics comparing individual outcomes between whites and Blacks are available in
Table B.1.
2.2 Longitudinal Tract Data Base
Census tract-level data come from the Longitudinal Tract Data Base (LTDB)
(Logan et al., 2014), and allow researchers to construct a variety of data that stem
from full count and sample data in the 1980-2000 Decennial Censuses and the
2008-2012 ACS 5-year data file. These census tract-level data include variables on
population, race, income, education, and workforce characteristics. The key
advantage in using the LTDB lies in its choice of census tract boundaries. Datasets
are available to reflect either longitudinally consistent boundaries fixed to a single
point in time, or the use of temporally-dependent census tract boundaries.
Additionally, because the data are provided as raw population counts I am able to
construct the characteristic of interest through aggregation of count data, rather
than weighting proportions to fit within larger levels of aggregation.10 Using the
Historical Delineation Files available from U.S. Census Bureau (2011), I aggregate
the detailed raw census tract data up to the MSA in order to construct various
city-level characteristics.11 I merge these MSA-aggregated neighborhood
characteristics to the individual data from IPUMS. MSA summary statistics are
available in Table B.2.
2.3 Opportunity Insights Data
The last data used in this study come from Opportunity Insights, a collaborative
between researchers at the Census Bureau, Harvard University, and Brown
10For example, I am able to construct census tract-level proportions using the raw census tract
data. I can also aggregate the raw data to higher levels of geography, such as the MSA-level, without
having to weight census tract proportions by their population, for instance.
11Census tracts are designed to fall entirely within counties, and counties fall entirely within MSA
boundaries. Thus, census tracts aggregate nicely within MSAs.
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University. The goal of Opportunity Insights focuses on reducing economic
inequalities using anonymized tax data on millions of individuals. The data are
publicly available at aggregated levels through the Opportunity Atlas and contain
more than 7,000 variables.12 I make use of census tract aggregated data which
include variables on local job growth and opportunities by income level,
incarceration rates, family completeness, geographic mobility, and intergenerational
mobility measured in varying years from 2010-2015. The chosen variables reflect the
unconditional mean, pooled by race and gender. It is important to also note that
the Opportunity Insights data contain information on children born between 1978
and 1983, and measures outcomes for these individuals into adulthood. My interests
in these variables lie within their geographic mobility tracking. With such measures,
I estimate the longitudinal effects of racial separation on leaving disadvantaged
childhood neighborhoods into adulthood, or moving to neighborhoods of affluence
into adulthood.
3 Measuring Racial Separation
U.S. Census Bureau (2010) provides several indices of racial separation that
capture to varying degrees evenness, exposure, concentration, and clustering;
however, the most widely used measure in the literature is referred to as the Index
of Dissimilarity.13 In this section, I formally define the Index of Dissimilarity,
discuss its properties and advantages, as well as empirically demonstrate how census
tract delineation is related to urban racial separation. Mathematically, the Index of
12Each variable can be selected according to specific race, gender, and percentile rank in the
parental national income distribution.
13Duncan and Duncan (1955) argued that the Index of Dissimilarity be the standard in measuring
racial separation in a city as it largely encapsulates information presented in differing measures of
separation. This measure has stood the test of time, and appears throughout recent work (e.g.,
Chetty and Hendren, 2018; Owens, 2016; Bayer et al., 2014; Ananat, 2011).
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Dissimilarity of a particular MSA is defined as:





∣∣∣∣ BlackiBlackMSA − Non− blackiNon− blackMSA
∣∣∣∣ , (1)
where Blacki and Non-blacki are the number of residents in census tract i that
are Black and non-Black, respectively. BlackMSA and Non-blackMSA are the
respective Black and non-Black populations of the Metropolitan Statistical Area,
MSA. The index ranges from zero to one, with values closer to one indicating
higher levels of racial separation. A key feature of the Index of Dissimilarity is the
interpretability of the decimal: this number reflects the proportion of the MSA that
would need to relocate to create an equal distribution of racial composition among
neighborhoods within the city of interest.14
Often measures of racial separation are based upon much smaller levels of
analysis, such as the neighborhood, and aggregated to some larger measure, such as
the city. The key advantage of such approach is the removal of endogenous sorting
of households within the city. For example, measures of racial separation at more
refined levels of aggregation suffer from Tiebout-like sorting of households. That is,
households “vote with their feet” into neighborhoods that align with their preference
distribution (Tiebout, 1956), and this influences neighborhood racial composition.
Thus, creating one measure that reflects the cumulative unevenness of
neighborhoods within a city overcomes the issue of intracity sorting.
I conclude this section by demonstrating that additional census tract delineation,
or nested census tracts, are correlated with levels of racial separation across cities.
14Stated alternatively, this measure captures the cumulative racial unevenness within each neigh-
borhood of the city.
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To illustrate this relationship, I estimate the following regression:
Racial Separationct = α0 + β nested census tractsct + f(populationct) + εct (2)
where Racial Separationct is the Index of Dissimilarity for city c at time t,
nested census tractsct refers to the number of census tracts within city c at time t,
f( · ) is a quartic function of the population, and εct is the error term. Standard
errors are robust and clustered to the city level. β is the coefficient of interest and is
interpreted as the percentage point change in racial separation as a result of an
additional census tract, conditional on population counts.
Figure 1 illustrates the coefficient β from Equation 2. Further regression
characteristics are presented in Table B.3. Each column is a separate regression of
Equation 2 cross sectionally and over time from 1980 to 2010. Over time, the effect
size on the correlation between the number of census tracts and levels of racial
separation has increased dramatically. The final column of Equation 2 indicates
that for each additional census tract over this period there is an average increase in
racial separation of 0.051 percentage points.
4 Empirical Analysis: the Effect of Racial Separation
The goal of this section lies in estimating the impacts of census tract-induced
racial separation on the economic opportunities one enjoys in life. I begin with a
discussion of why the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation is
inappropriate for obtaining causal estimates of racial separation. Next, I present an
alternative identification method using instrumental variables (IV). I provide a
falsification exercise that further tests the accuracy of the instrument. I conclude by
replicating, updating, and extending the results found in Cutler and Glaeser (1997).
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N=1,019 (1980-2010). Each column represents a separate regression estimated from Equation 2. The
dependent variable in each specification is the level of racial separation within a city and is defined as
the Index of Dissimilarity. The independent variable of interest is the number of census tracts that
exist in each specification year. Each specification includes a quartic function in population, and
standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. Racial separation mean (1980-2010) = 50.59%
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4.1 Discussion
In order to evaluate the impacts of racial separation on Black and non-Black
individuals’ economic opportunities, I adopt the following general econometric
framework:
yic = α + β1separationc + β2blacki × separationc +X ′icβ + εic (3)
where the dependent variable is the outcome of interest for individual i in city c,
separation is the measure of racial separation formally defined as the Index of
Dissimilarity, and black is an indicator that equals one if the individual is Black.
The coefficient of interest, β2, is interpreted as the differential effect of racial
separation for Black individuals, relative to non-Black individuals. Some readers
may also be interested in the effects of β1 or β1 + β2 which reflect the differential
effects of racial separation for non-Blacks, and the total effect of racial separation
for Blacks, respectively. In general, two types of issues arise when estimation occurs
within this framework. The first is that the level of racial separation in a city may
be a function of poor outcomes, or more formally, reverse causality. The second
stems from issues of selection bias whereby more and less successful individuals may
sort across metropolitan areas. Both violate the restrictions necessary for causal
inference.
4.2 Identification using Census Tracts
To estimate the causal impacts of racial separation, I require a treatment that
randomizes the racial composition of neighborhoods, but is not related to the
outcomes one enjoys in life except through its effect on separation. The ideal
experiment would randomize individuals’ residences at two levels across isolated
cities: The first would randomize individuals across cities, and the second would
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randomize individuals into neighborhoods. Randomization across cities would
provide analysis as to how cumulative racial separation impacts economic
opportunities, while the second would allow estimation of local racial composition
impacts relative to neighborhoods close by.
In the absence of such randomization, I rely on a strategy that makes use of
plausibly exogenous variation in census tract boundaries for identification.
Specifically, I use variation in the number of census tracts, conditional on
population characteristics, as an instrument to estimate the impacts of racial
separation. The assumption for causal inference using this identification strategy
asserts that, conditional on population characteristics, the number of (or change in)
census tracts (boundaries) is exogenous. That is, after accounting for population
characteristics, there is not some potentially unidentifiable feature correlated with
boundary arrangement that would also impact one’s economic outcomes.
Before moving to the main estimation of racial separation, I provide a falsification
test of the instrument. This exercise is similar to the relationship developed through
Equation 2, and illustrated in Figure 1; however, instead of estimating the
relationship between the number of census tracts and the level of racial separation
constructed using contemporaneous census tract boundaries, I collapse census tracts
to their original boundary “envelopes” and calculate the measure of racial separation
using these outer shells. Figure 2 enhances the visualization of this exercise. Panel
(a) illustrates the original census tract “envelope” and panel (b) shows the resulting
census tract boundaries nested within the envelope after the 2000 Decennial Census.
To construct the measure of racial separation holding census tract envelopes fixed
to their original boundary delineations, I collapse panel (b) census tract
characteristics to their outer envelopes reflected in panel (a). Then, I estimate
Equation 2 replacing the dependent variable, Racial Separationct, with the measure
of racial separation calculated using the collapsed census tract envelopes. The
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Figure 2: Census Tract Implementation and Delineation
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2013) This figure shows the evolution of census tract envelope 1130 of
Salt Lake County, Utah at two points in time. Panel (a) is the original census tract “envelope” and
was established in 1970. Panel (b) shows the updated census tract boundaries resulting from the
2000 Decennial Census.
intuition behind this test is as follows: If additional census tract delineation
generates racial separation and the measure of racial separation is calculated using a
fixed number of census tract envelopes, then there should be no correlation between
the number of contemporaneous census tracts and the envelope-fixed racial
separation index over time. Alternatively, if a relationship does exist within this
framework, it could be argued that the number of census tracts instead reflect some
unobservable characteristic that also induces racial separation, rather than the
boundaries themselves.
Figure 3 illustrates the results of this falsification test. Further regression
characteristics are presented in Table B.4. In 1980 there exists a positive
relationship similar to that found in Figure 1, documenting the relationship between
census tracts and racial separation. This makes sense because most census tract
envelopes were created in 1980, and thus should be correlated with the level of
racial separation if census tracts generate separation; however, beyond this point we
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1980 1990 2000  2010 1980-2010
Specification Year
95% CI
Relationship using 1980-Fixed Census Tract Envelope
N=895 (1980-2010). Each column represents a separate regression. The dependent variable in each
specification is the level of racial separation within a city and is defined as the Index of Dissimilarity.
This measure is calculated using fixed census tract envelopes that were established in either 1970
or 1980. The independent variable of interest is the number of census tracts that exist in each
specification year. The sample includes MSAs that existed in 1980 and could be followed to 2010.
Each specification includes a quartic function in population, and standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity. Racial separation mean (1980-2010) = 50.59%
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would expect to see no relationship as boundaries are collapsed to their original
shells while true boundaries evolve beyond this point in time.
4.3 IV Estimation
In the current empirical setting, I exploit variation in neighborhood boundaries
to estimate the effect of census tract-induced racial separation on educational, labor
market, and social outcomes. I adopt an instrumental variables approach using
two-stage least squares (2SLS) where the number of census tracts instruments for
cumulative levels of racial separation in a city. More formally, the first-stage of my
IV estimation is:
sct = α0 + α1nct + x
′
ctθ + ρc + γt + νct, (4)
where the dependent variable sct is the level of racial separation in city c and
year t. The instrument nct is the number of census tracts in city c and year t.15 The
vector xct contains city-level control variables, including population, percent Black,
percent Hispanic, percent with a high school degree or less, percent manufacturing,
unemployment rate, median HH income, percent married, and separation by skill
level. ρ and γ are city and time fixed effects, respectively, and νct is the error term.
Using exogenous variation from the fitted values of Equation 4, second-stage
estimation is a variation of Equation 3 correcting for issues of endogeneity:
yicbt = β0 + β1ŝct + β2blackicbt ∗ ŝct + x
′
ictθ + ηc + φb + πt + εicbt, (5)
where yicbt is the outcome of interest for individual i, born in state b, lives in city c,
in year t. The remaining variables and fixed effects are analogous to those in
15In the resulting empirical analysis, I also use the number of census tracts interacted with the
black indicator variable. The work of Cutler and Glaeser (1997) follows the strategy of interacting
their instrument,as well.
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Equation 4 with the inclusion of individual-level controls: age, sex, educational
attainment, and birth-state fixed effects. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and intra-MSA clustering.
Table 1: IV Estimates of the Effects of Racial Separation on Economic Opportunities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HS dropout College graduate ln(income) Idle Single motherhood
Separation -0.0001 0.0011*** -0.0003 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0006)
Black*separation 0.0016*** -0.0060*** -0.0024*** 0.0011*** 0.0038***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Mean of dep. var. 11.64% 22.24% $24,997.51 6.24% 31.61%
R2 0.034 0.127 0.223 0.047 0.1859
N 1592503 1592503 1378543 1305801 123236
The first-stage coefficient from Equation 4 is 0.001 (std. error <0.000) and is significant at the 1%
level. HS dropout is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual completed less than grade
12 in 1980, and in later years equals 1 if the individual completed grade 12, or less, and did not
receive a diploma. College graduate is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual completed
at least 4 years of college in 1980, and in later years equals 1 if the individual has a bachelor’s degree
or higher. Income is defined as earned income, and is conditional on being in the labor force with
nonnegative earnings. Idleness is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual is in the labor
force, but neither going to school nor employed. Single motherhood is an indicator that equals 1
if the female is not currently married, and has ever had a child in 1980 or 1990. In 2010 single
motherhood refers to females who are not currently married and have had a child in the last year.
Single motherhood data are not available for 2000. Separation is defined as the Index of Dissimilarity,
and the interaction term includes an indicator if the individual is Black. Individual controls include
sex, age, and educational attainment. City-level controls include population, percent Black and its
interaction, percent Hispanic, percent with a high school degree or less, percent manufacturing and
its interaction, unemployment rate, median HH income, percent married, segregation by skill level,
birth place state FE, and year and region FE. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity
and intra-MSA clustering.
Coefficients statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10% levels.
Table 1 presents the results of estimating Equation 5 in the spirit of Cutler and
Glaeser (1997). Appendix Table B.5 presents OLS estimation results. In terms of
educational attainment, a one percentage point increase in racial separation reduces
the probabilities of a Black individual completing high school or college by 0.16 and
0.60 percentage points, respectively. Further, after accounting for differences in
education, and conditional on being employed, a one percentage point increase in
racial separation reduces a Black individual’s annual earnings by 0.24 percent, and
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increases the probability of idleness in the labor market by 0.11 percentage points
compared to non-Black individuals. Lastly, Column (5) suggests racial separation
increases the probability of single motherhood for Black females relative to
non-Black females. In the context of Cutler and Glaeser (1997), I find that the
effects of racial separation for non-Black individuals become largely insignificant
after accounting for issues of endogeneity. Given the average difference between high
and low racially separated cities in 2010 was 20.3 percentage points, these estimates
indicate large reductions in economic opportunities for Black residents, and little to
no benefit of racial separation for non-Black residents.
4.4 Heterogeneous Effects
Previous work has been limited in answering questions of heterogeneous impacts
– Are negative impacts of racial separation driven by concentrated declines in
outcomes for the worst-off individuals, or do these effects remain as we move across
outcome distributions? In order to answer questions of this type, I estimate
regressions separating income and education according to various thresholds. I
begin by estimating Equation 5 where the dependent variable is replaced as a series
of increasing income decile thresholds within the national income distribution for
individuals ages 20 to 30.
Figure 4 illustrates the results of this first heterogeneity exercise. Each column is
a separate regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for being in at
least the specified income decile along the x-axis. Coefficients are multiplied by 100
so that effect sizes have an interpretation of hundredths of a percentage point. The
figure suggests that not only does racial separation reduce the likelihoods a Black
young person reaches the highest income decile, but the estimate in column 1
suggests a one percentage point increase in racial separation reduces the probability
a Black individual moves beyond the first income decile by 0.26 percentage points
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Income Decile
Black Non-black 95 CI
By Minimum Income Decile
N=1,591,735. Each column is a separate regression where the dependent variable is an indicator for
at being in at least the specified income decile along the x-axis. Estimates indicate the percentage
point change in the probability of reaching at least the specified decile in the income distribution
among those ages 20-30. Regressions include all controls specified in Equation 5. Standard errors
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and intra-MSA clustering.
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relative to a non-Black individual. Further, a one percentage point increase in racial
separation reduces the probability a Black young person (ages 20-30) earns more
than the median income earner in the national income distribution by 0.12
percentage points. These negative impacts illustrate the significant inequalities
Black residents face in the labor market at a result of increased separation by race,
relative to non-Black individuals.
To disaggregate the effects of racial separation by skill level, I examine impacts
on differing levels of educational attainment. Specifically, I estimate versions of
Equation 5 where the dependent variable is an indicator if the individual has
reached at least the specified level of education: high school graduate, some college,
associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, and graduate degree.
Figure 5 presents the impacts of racial separation on increasing levels of
educational attainment. While the effects of racial separation not only impact the
probability that Black individuals complete some college, these negative impacts
remain even for those who go on to receive graduate education – likely two distinct
groups in terms of underlying abilities. To summarize the total effect across the
skills distribution, at the lowest levels of educational attainment, separation by race
is harmful regardless of race. At higher levels of attainment, results suggest racial
separation reduces the likelihood of Black individuals becoming more skilled –
negative estimates are an order of magnitude larger in absolute value for Black
students compared to non-Black students.
5 Mechanism Analysis of Tract-Induced Racial Separation
The goal of this section is to consider potential causes and consequences of
census tract-induced racial separation. To explore mechanisms behind the negative
impacts Black residents face, I focus on two hypotheses: The first tests for weakened
labor market attachment among Black residents. The second hypothesis tests that
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Black Non-black 95% CI
By Minimum Education Level
N=1,592,503. Each column is a separate regression and estimates the percentage point change in the
probability of completing at least that level of education. Regressions include all controls specified in
Equation 5. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and intra-MSA clustering. In 1980:
high school is defined as having completed grade 12; some college is defined as having completed
one year of post-secondary education; associate’s degree is defined as having completed two years of
college; bachelor’s degree is defined as completing four years of college; graduate degree is defined
as 6 years of college.
Blacks have worse outcomes in more racially separated neighborhoods because they
have less contact with positive peer influences. I conclude by examining the impact
census tract-induced racial separation has on the ability to leave predominantly
Black neighborhoods into adulthood.
I begin by estimating a variant of Equation 5 where the unit of analysis is the
neighborhood rather than the individual. More formally, I adopt the following
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econometric framework:
ync = γ0 + γ1ŝc + γ2blacknc ∗ ŝc + x
′
cθ + εnc (6)
where the dependent variable ync is the outcome of interest for neighborhood n in
city c, ŝc is the fitted value of racial separation estimated from Equation 4 in city c,
blacknc is an indicator variable that is used within two specifications: the first equals
1 if neighborhood n is “predominantly” Black reflecting a Black resident proportion
of 75 percent or greater. The second specification defines blacknc equal to 1 if the
neighborhood is “heavily” Black, or at least 90 percent Black. My IV estimation
strategy is now estimating the impact of cumulative racial separation in
predominantly Black neighborhoods, relative to less-Black neighborhoods. Standard
errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and intra-MSA clustering. A majority of
the dependent variables in this analysis come from newly available Opportunity
Insights data and are available on a cross-sectional basis, and thus, my analysis is
limited to cross-sectional evidence.
To evaluate labor market attachment for Black individuals, I examine whether
there are fewer local job opportunities for Black residents relative to those who live
in less-Black neighborhoods. Local job opportunities consist of those falling within 5
miles of the neighborhood of interest. I restrict this measure further to consider only
high paying local job opportunities, defined as local jobs with monthly earnings of
at least $3,333 (2010 dollars). Lastly, I consider whether Black individuals face
increased costs of getting to their jobs, conditional on being employed, as a result of
increased separation.
Table 2 presents the first set of results in testing for weakened labor market
attachment among predominantly Black neighborhoods. Panel (a) refers to
neighborhoods with a Black residency of at least 75 %, while panel (b) re-estimates
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Table 2: Separation and Job Availability in Predominantly Black Neighborhoods
Panel (a): Predominantly Black neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3)
# of jobs # of high paying jobs Annual job growth
Separation 104.3951*** 138.0593** -0.0004***
(39.3711) (67.7192) (0.0000>)
≥75% Black*separation -1728.3485*** -1493.4829*** 0.0005***
(553.4968) (341.7891) (0.0002)
Mean of dep. var. 138,514.6 71,646.09 1.65%
R2 0.255 0.216 0.020
N 50211 50211 49789
Panel (b): Heavily Black neighborhoods
(4) (5) (6)
# of jobs # of high paying jobs Annual job growth
Separation 171.8717*** 102.4362*** -0.0004***
(63.7431) (36.8704) (0.0000>)
≥90% Black*separation -3964.8218*** -2592.5179*** 0.0005
(700.1144) (439.3370) (0.0003)
R2 0.255 0.216 0.019
N 50211 50211 49789
Estimates use only the most recent data in the analysis, 2010. Neighborhood-level jobs data come
from Opportunity Insights. The variable # of jobs refers to the total number of jobs in own and
neighboring tracts whose centroids fall within a 5 mile radius from own tract centroid in 2015. The
variable # of high paying jobs restricts # of jobs to those with earnings greater than $3,333 per
month in 2015. Annual job growth refers to the average annualized job growth rate over the time
period 2004 to 2013. Separation is defined as the Index of Dissimilarity in 2010, and the interaction
term includes an indicator if the neighborhood is greater than or equal to 75% and 90% in the
respective panels. 2010 city-level controls include population, percent Black and its interaction
term, percent Hispanic, percent with high school degree or less, percent in manufacturing and its
interaction, unemployment rate, median HH income, percent married, and separation by skill level.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and intra-MSA clustering.
Coefficients statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10% levels.
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Equation 6 using increased requirements on neighborhood characterization.16 Taken
together, columns (1) and (2) indicate that not only are there fewer high paying
local job opportunities in predominantly Black neighborhoods, but fewer job
opportunities in general. Put into perspective, an individual moving from a city of
low separation into a predominantly Black neighborhood in a city of high racial
separation can expect about a 25 percent reduction in local job opportunities, on
average.17 While Panel (a) suggests some evidence of increased job growth in
predominantly Black neighborhoods, these estimates become insignificant when
focusing on heavily Black neighborhoods.
Table 3 is estimated from Equation 5 and includes the sample of individuals who
are employed and not working from home. Results reinforce the evidence found in
Table 2 that fewer local job opportunities result in increased commuting costs.
Black residents face significantly longer travel times to work, and are more likely to
rely on public transportation as a result of increased racial separation, relative to
non-Black individuals. These negative impacts are further reflected in the reduction
in the usual hours worked per week for Black individuals, even after accounting for
experience and education factors. To summarize Tables 2 and 3, my evidence
suggests that racial separation reduces labor market attachment by placing fewer
jobs in predominantly Black communities and forcing Black residents to more
heavily rely on public transportation to commute to further away jobs.
To evaluate peer influences for Black individuals, I examine whether
predominantly Black neighborhoods have differential likelihoods of interacting with
educated individuals, relative to less Black-neighborhoods. I restrict this measure
further to consider the likelihood of interacting with Black educated individuals in
predominantly Black neighborhoods. Lastly, I examine whether predominantly
16About five percent of the sample falls with the category of a “heavily” Black neighborhood.
17High racial separation refers to a city with an Index of Dissimilarity above the mean. The average
difference between cities of high racial separation and low separation in 2010 was 20.3 percentage
points. This reduction is based on an average number of local job opportunities found in Table 2.
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Table 3: Separation and Individual Transportation Factors
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hours worked/week Travel time Motor vehicle Public transit
Separation -0.0078*** -0.0219*** 0.0015*** -0.0013***
(0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0000>) (0.0000>)
Black*separation -0.0471*** 0.2293*** -0.0041*** 0.0049***
(0.0039) (0.0081) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Mean of dep. var. 39.93 hours 21.91 minutes 88.18% 6.04%
R2 0.075 0.081 0.094 0.127
N 968424 968424 952705 952705
Estimates use the full panel of data from 1980 to 2010 and are estimated from Equation 5. Hours
worked/week is defined as the usual hours worked per week in the previous year. Travel time
is defined as the usual number of minutes it took to get from home to work last week, and is
topcoded at 120 minutes. Individuals that recorded times greater than the top code were given
the state average travel time for those greater than 120 minutes. Motor vehicle is an indicator
that equals 1 if the means of transportation to work is a non-public auto vehicle, truck, van, or
motorcycle. Public transit is an indicator that equals 1 if the means of transportation to work is
public transportation including bus, streetcar, trolley bus/car, subway/elevated, railroad, taxicab,
or ferryboat. All estimates are conditional on being in the labor force, not in school, and columns
(3) and (4) are also conditional on not working at home. Separation is defined as the Index of
Dissimilarity, and the interaction term includes an indicator if the individual is Black. Individual
controls include sex, age, educational attainment., and birth state fixed effects. City-level controls
include population, percent Black and its interaction, percent Hispanic, percent with a high school
degree or less, percent manufacturing and its interaction, unemployment rate, median HH income,
percent married, separation by skill level, and year and region FE. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and intra-MSA clustering.
Coefficients statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10% levels.
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Black neighborhoods are less likely to have complete families and more individuals
incarcerated as a result of increased separation.
Before discussing the results of the peer influences hypothesis, I formally
construct the measure of interaction among neighborhood groups.18 This measure is



















where the first term is the proportion of Black residents in neighborhood n relative
to the total MSA, the second is the proportion of college educated individuals in
neighborhood n, and the final term is the proportion of college educated individuals
in the MSA as a whole. The product of the first two captures the probability that
Black and college educated individuals interact within neighborhood n, while the
subtraction of the MSA proportion of college educated individuals removes
differences in general education levels across MSAs. An index greater than zero
indicates that Blacks differentially live in neighborhoods with high levels of college
educated individuals, while a negative index indicates that Blacks differentially live
in neighborhoods with less educated people. The average Education Exposure Index
constructed from Equation 7 is -19.75 indicating that Black individuals differentially
live in neighborhoods with fewer educated individuals.
The results in Table 4 are used to evaluate the peer influences hypothesis.
Column (1) reflects a more general version of the Education Exposure Index found
in Equation 7. This measure removes the first term in Equation 7, and reflects the
differential proportion of college educated living in neighborhood n. Column (2)
reflects the index found in Equation 7. Together, columns (1) and (2) indicate that
not only are predominantly Black neighborhoods less likely to have educated
individuals, but increased racial separation reduces the likelihood of interaction
18A similar measure is found in Cutler and Glaeser (1997).
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Table 4: Separation and Peer Influences in Predominantly Black Neighborhoods
Panel (a): Predominantly Black neighborhoods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ed. exposure Weighted ed. exposure Father present Incarcerated
Separation 0.0257*** -0.0708*** 0.0382*** -0.0076***
(0.0061) (0.0010) (0.0053) (0.0008)
≥75% Black*separation -0.1661*** -0.0258*** -0.3166*** -0.0010
(0.0131) (0.0017) (0.0169) (0.0031)
Mean of dep. var. 0.02 -19.75 77.86 % 1.57 %
R2 0.053 0.863 0.377 0.261
N 49840 49840 49577 49511
Panel (b): Heavily Black neighborhoods
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Ed. exposure Weighted ed. exposure Father present Incarcerated
Separation 0.0206*** -0.0717*** 0.0175*** -0.0061***
(0.0061) (0.0010) (0.0059) (0.0008)
≥90% Black*separation -0.2256*** -0.0266*** -0.3508*** 0.0082
(0.0192) (0.0024) (0.0254) (0.0051)
R2 0.034 0.863 0.271 0.181
N 49840 49840 49577 49511
Estimates use only the most recent data in the analysis, 2010. Neighborhood-level peer effects data
come from Opportunity Insights. Ed. exposure is a demeaned index measure of interaction. A
positive Ed. exposure refers to a neighborhood that has a higher than average percent of college
educated. Weighted ed. exposure is demeaned and weighted by the Black population in a given
neighborhood relative to the entire city. A positive weighted ed. exposure indicates a neighborhood
where Blacks differentially live in a more educated neighborhood. Father present refers to the
percent of children who have a male claimer. Incarcerated refers to the percent in a federal detention
center, federal prison, state prison, local jail, residential correctional facility, military jail, or juvenile
correctional facility. Separation is defined as the Index of Dissimilarity in 2010, and the interaction
term includes an indicator if the neighborhood is greater than or equal to 75% and 90% in the
respective panels. 2010 city-level controls include population, percent Black and its interaction
term, percent Hispanic, percent with high school degree or less, percent in manufacturing and its
interaction, unemployment rate, median HH income, percent married, and separation by skill level.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and intra-MSA clustering.
Coefficients statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10% levels.
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between Black and college educated individuals. Further, increased racial separation
in predominantly Black neighborhoods largely impacts the proportion of households
with a father present – a one percentage point increase in racial separation reduces
the proportion of complete families in predominantly Black neighborhoods by 0.32
percentage points, relative to less-Black neighborhoods.
To conclude this section, I estimate the impacts that census tract-induced racial
separation has on both economic and geographic mobilities. Opportunity Insights
provides data on the proportions of children born between 1978 and 1983 who
remain in one of their childhood neighborhoods into adulthood. Additionally, they
provide proportions who leave one of their childhood neighborhoods in exchange for
a neighborhood with a poverty rate of less than 10 percent into adulthood. I apply
my IV strategy using 1980 census tract-induced variation to measure the effects of
1980 racial separation levels on these longitudinal geographic mobility variables,
after accounting for present day levels of separation. Lastly, I estimate the impacts
that census tract-induced racial separation has on the probability of a
predominantly Black neighborhood generating economic mobility to the top of the
national income distribution.
Table 5 presents the results of childhood census tract-induced racial separation
on economic and geographic mobilities in predominantly Black neighborhoods.
Appendix Table B.6 presents these results for heavily Black neighborhoods. A one
percentage point increase in childhood racial separation increases the proportion
remaining in a predominantly Black childhood neighborhood into adulthood by
0.044 percentage points, relative to less-Black childhood neighborhoods.
Additionally, childhood racial separation reduces the proportion growing up in
predominantly Black childhood neighborhood that move into neighborhoods of
affluence in adulthood. Columns (3) and (4) further verify the relationship found in
Figure 4, depicting the heterogeneous impacts of advancing up the income
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Table 5: Separation and Geographic and Economic Mobility in Predominantly Black
Neighborhoods
Geographic Mobility Economic Mobility
















earnersSeparation -0.0199 0.0773 0.0258*** 0.3408***
(0.0183) (0.0583) (0.0051) (0.0264)
≥75%
Black*separation
0.0438** -0.2445*** -0.0367*** -0.2164***
(0.0204) (0.0236) (0.0018) (0.0119)
Mean of dep.
Var.
19.36% 49.16% 1.16% 21.04%
R2 0.156 0.257 0.064 0.194
N 45368 45368 45379 45379
Census tract-level data come from Opportunity Insights, and consist of data collected for individuals
born between 1978-1983. In columns (1) and (2), childhood refers to individuals up to age 23. Since
columns (1) and (2) refer to data based upon childhood census tracts, estimates are calculated using
1980 racial separation levels with the number of 1980 census tracts as the instrument, 1980 controls,
and present day levels of separation. Columns (3) and (4) refer to the estimated probability of an
individual in a given tract reaching the respective percentile of the national income distribution
(among children born in the same cohort) in 2014-2015. Columns (3) and (4) are estimated using
2010 racial separation levels, census tract count, and controls. Separation is defined as the Index
of Dissimilarity, and the interaction term includes an indicator if the neighborhood is greater than
or equal to 75% Black. City-level controls include population, percent Black and its interaction
term, percent Hispanic, percent with high school degree or less, percent in manufacturing and its
interaction, unemployment rate, median HH income, percent married, and segregation by skill level.
Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and intra-MSA clustering.
Coefficients statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10% levels.
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distribution. Both columns indicate that census tract-induced racial separation in
predominantly Black neighborhoods reduces the probability of the neighborhood
serving as an engine to drive economic mobility.
6 Conclusion
While the United States is the most diverse it’s ever been, urban America
continues to be racially and economically divided. A longstanding literature has
attributed economic disparities between races to this urban racial inequality;
however, less focus has been placed on the link through which racial separation
impacts economic opportunities for minority residents, and whether these effects
impact minorities differentially.
This paper makes several contributions to this literature. First, by leveraging
variation in census tract boundaries from the 1980 to 2010 Decennial Census
boundary updates, I estimate heterogeneous impacts of urban racial separation on
several economic outcomes of interest. Second, using this variation in census tract
delineation paired with detailed neighborhood data through Opportunity Insights, I
push two hypotheses further in explaining the negative impacts that minority
residents face through increased racial separation. Lastly, I document the impact
that racial separation has on geographic and economic mobilities for individuals
growing up in predominantly black neighborhoods.
My first key set of results suggest that the negative impacts of racial separation
are not driven by effects concentrated among the worst-off individuals, instead these
impacts remain across both the income and skills distributions. Potential channels
for the resulting negative relationships include reduced labor market attachment for
Black individuals, as well as reduced positive peer influences in predominantly Black
neighborhoods. Results suggest that not only are there fewer job opportunities in
these neighborhoods, but that Black residents rely more heavily on public
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transportation to commute to further away jobs, as a result of increased racial
separation. Lastly, I empirically demonstrate that increased racial separation in
predominantly Black neighborhoods reduces the probability of the neighborhood
serving as a driver of economic mobility into adulthood.
To my knowledge, this is the first paper to use census tract boundaries in
measuring urban racial separation. Several related papers have used historical and
geographic features as instruments to measure how neighborhood racial composition
affects outcomes of interest, and this work contributes a new identification approach
that can be applied both spatially and temporally. Future work should consider
alternative impacts of census tract-induced racial separation, and ultimately how
census tract delineation may play a role in shaping neighborhood dynamics.
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Chapter 3
THE LANDSCAPE OF HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLMENT:
EVIDENCE FROM THE EXPANSION OF THE FOR-PROFIT
SECTOR
1 Introduction
Every year the federal government spends billions of dollars financing higher
education. In the 2014-2015 school year alone, the federal government subsidized
over $30 billion to degree granting 4-year institutions Goodwin et al. (2015). These
programs, the largest being the Pell Grant program, are targeted at students who
are faced with borrowing constraints and would otherwise be unlikely to attend an
institution of higher education at all in the absence of financial assistance. The goal
of these higher education government programs is to not only encourage students to
enroll in higher education, but for these students to complete a degree in higher
education. In the early 2000s, the expansion of for-profit sector of higher education
attracted many of these marginal students induced to enroll by these subsidies. The
subsidization of higher education appears efficient in the sense that costs of
attending appear small relative to the returns to college; however, this is based on
average returns to a higher education degree. Deming et al. (2016) and Cellini and
Turner (2019) provide evidence suggesting there may be large penalties for
attending a for-profit institution of higher education. Thus, institutional quality
may play a large role in determining just how large the labor market returns to
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higher education really are. Furthermore, many of these marginal students are
failing to graduate creating inefficiencies in the subsidization of higher education.
This paper documents the changing landscape of enrollment and graduation
rates throughout the distribution of institution quality from 2001 to 2011. Because
there were large increases within the for-profit sector over this period (illustrated in
Figure 1), it can be difficult to capture individual schools that were opened between
2001 and 2011 and provide a consistent quality ranking of higher education. My
unique approach accounts for schools that did not exist prior to 2001 by grouping
institutions into specific ventiles of the quality distribution rather than assessing
individual institutions themselves.1 This allows me to capture recently opened
institutions as well as a consistent landscape of institution quality. I conclude by
decomposing aggregate graduation rates across various portions of the institution
quality distribution. This exercise captures how the changing enrollment landscape
across higher education contributed to changes in aggregate graduation rates.
Numerous studies have examined the impact of financial aid on student outcomes
(e.g., Angrist et al. (2017); Denning et al. (2019); Dynarski (2003)). Most of these
studies rely on an experimental design or exploit a change in policy in order to
evaluate the causal effect of financial aid on attainment and earnings. For example,
Angrist et al. (2017) find that randomly-selected scholarship winners were 13
percentage points more likely to be enrolled in college four years after award receipt.
Furthermore, enrollment effects were larger for groups with historically low college
attendance. In terms of completions, Angrist et al. (2017) find that scholarship
receipt is likely to increase bachelor’s degree completion within five years.
Additionally, Denning et al. (2019) show that grant aid targeting disadvantaged
students, who attend public universities in Texas generates significant attainment
and earnings gains. The authors further show that tax receipts from these future
1The institution quality measure is constructed from early career returns of the institution.
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Total Enrollment Enrollment Excluding For-Profit Institutions
Time period is from 1947-2015. The solid line indicates enrollment in primarily baccalaureate and
above granting institutions including both for-profit and not-for-profit institutions. The dashed line
indicates enrollment in primarily baccalaureate and above granting institutions excluding for-profit
institutions. Data are from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and Integrated
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). (accessed December 4, 2016).
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higher-wage earners are sufficiently large that the government should fully recover
its financial investment in ten years.
Current research is less extensive in providing the “big picture” in higher
education enrollment and completion. That is, while much of the previous literature
estimates the impact of financial aid on enrollment and completion, these studies
are often restricted to individuals within a particular type or group of institutions.
In this research, I provide the changing landscape of enrollment and completions
over the rapid expansion of the for-profit sector in higher education. I am able to
capture almost 90 percent of 4-year, primarily bachelor degree granting institutions.
Specifically, I construct a measure of quality using the median early-career wage for
graduates from each institution and examine how enrollments and graduation rates
have evolved over this period. Furthermore, using a shift-share decomposition
analysis, I am examine how the changing landscape of enrollment in higher
education has contributed to the change in aggregate U.S. graduation rates.
Overall, I find that in the lowest quality institutions, enrollment grew by over 100
percent from 2001 to 2011, also where graduation rates have fallen almost five
percentage points. Additionally, in the lowest quartile of institution quality, 74
percent of the decline in graduation rates is due to the changing enrollment
composition across the distribution over this period.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief overview
of the literature as it relates to enrollment and graduation rates in higher education.
Section 3 highlights the data and empirical strategy used in my descriptive analysis.
Section 4 illustrates the landscape of higher education as well as the decomposition
analysis surrounding aggregate graduation rates. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Morey (2004) argues that there were two main contributors to the rapid rise of
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the for-profit sector of higher education in the early 21st century. She explains how
the globalization of economic, cultural, political, and intellectual institutions, and
the increasing interdependence of nations overhauled the landscape of higher
education. Globalization coupled with the revolution in technological change only
accelerated this change in the rise of the for-profit sector. Specifically, as
globalization occurred there was increased demand for accessible and career-oriented
adult education at the postsecondary level to fill the needs of corporations as they
expanded to international markets. She also notes how attractive for-profit higher
education is. That is, many of their degree granting programs are offered online and
have freed education from being time and place bound. Furthermore, Morey (2004)
explains how many who attend for-profit higher education realize they are not
receiving a degree from a “brand name” institution, and that this fact is overlooked
in order to fulfill the degree requirements for a career objective. Lastly, Morey
(2004) research documents how the for-profit sector is able to respond to changing
consumer demands in terms of level of degrees offered, accessibility through distance
education, and the award of credit for life experiences to speed up the time to
completion.
Webber and Ehrenberg (2010) document how the impact of decreased median
instructional spending relative to other categories of expenditures (research, public
service, academic support, etc.) has affected graduation and persistence in
American higher education. Using institutional level panel data, the authors find
that several categories other than instructional spending affect student outcomes,
but this effect varies by socioeconomic background and the average test scores of the
students at that institution. Specifically, their analysis shows that the marginal
effect of increasing student service expenditures by $100 per student increases
graduation rates by 0.6 percentage points for institutions with initial graduation
rates lower than 50 percent. In terms of instructional expenditures, a $100 increase
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per student results in only a 0.2 percentage point increase. Webber and Ehrenberg
(2010) conclude by arguing that the reallocation of $100 per student from
instructional expenditures to student service expenditures would increase the
institution graduation rate by more than 0.5 percentage points for institutions in
the lowest 20 percent of the distribution in terms of graduation rates.
Chung (2012) investigates whether students self-select into the U.S. for-profit
higher education, whether the choice is accidental, or due to reasons external
(geographic exposure, tuition pricing, etc.) to the student. Using the National
Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 as her primary data source, Chung (2012)
finds that students do, in fact, self-select into for-profit higher education and that
the choice of for-profit higher education is affected by community college tuition and
the exposure to for-profit institutions within the county. She also finds that the
probability of a student choosing a for-profit college is heavily influenced by the
student’s socioeconomic background and parental involvement in the student’s
schooling. Overall, the analysis of Chung (2012) includes a rich set of covariates
that indicates it’s the most disadvantaged students, in terms of non-cognitive skills,
lower parental involvement, and lower family resources, that are self-selecting into
these for-profit institutions of higher education.
3 Data Background and Empirical Design
3.1 Data
The data used in this analysis come from three sources. The primary source is
the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). The IPEDS is the
National Center for Education Statistics’ (NCES) core postsecondary education
data collection program. It’s designed to house information on all institutions that
participate in Title IV federal student aid programs. The sample consists of U.S.
public, private not-for-profit, and private for-profit 4-year or above institutions with
66
a degree granting status of primarily baccalaureate or above. Variables from IPEDS
on these institutions consist of enrollment and graduation rates within 6-years of
degree start. Graduation rates are selected to reflect the enrollment cohort of the
respective year. As Figure 1 illustrates a dramatic increase in for-profit enrollment
starting at 2001, this is the base year of the analysis. IPEDS has provisional data
available for graduates from the 2016-2017 academic year reflecting the most recent
6-year graduation rates for the 2011 cohort. Thus, the 2001 and 2011 enrollment
cohorts for institutions are used in this study.
The two other sources of data are used to construct the measure of institution
quality. My primary source of wage data come from data used in Chetty et al.
(2017) available from Opportunity Insights2. In this data, median individual
earnings in 2014 are available at the institution level for individuals who attended
college between ages 19 to 22 in the mid 2000s. While this data captures a majority
of the institutions used in the analysis, I also use wage data from the U.S.
Department of Education’s College Scorecard3 to expand the sample size. College
Scorecard collects median wage information for graduates of the institution who entered
10 years prior. So, the data currently available through College Scorecard reflect median
wages of the 2006 cohort by institution. Comparisons between Opportunity Insights and
College Scorecard were done to ensure within institution median wages were similar.
Table 1 provides institution descriptive statistics. The total sample consists of
2,096 institutions4.The growth in public and private, not-for-profit (NFP
henceforth) institutions is minimal in comparison to the growth in private, for-profit
(FP henceforth) institutions from 2001 to 2011 with growth of these types of
institutions being just over 70 percent. Observe that in 2001 average undergraduate
enrollment in NFP institutions was larger than that of FP institutions. In 2011, not
2https://opportunityinsights.org/data/
3collegescorecard.ed.gov
4Military institutions were removed from the analysis due to the Iraq War beginning in 2003.
They include: U.S. Airforce Academy, U.S. Coast Guard Academy, U.S. Merchant Marine Academy,
U.S. Military Academy, and U.S. Naval Academy.
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Table 1: Institution Descriptive Statistics
N=2096 2001 2011
Public, 4-year+ N=553 N=562
% missing wage data 0
Average undergraduate enrollment 8795 10357
Growth of institution type (%) 1.6
Share of type 30.3 28
Private, not-for-profit, 4-year+ N=1124 N=1198
% missing wage data 10.5
Average undergraduate enrollment 1867 2130
Growth of institution type (%) 6.6
Share of type 61.6 59.6
Private, for-profit, 4-year+ N=147 N=250
% missing wage data 4.8
Average undergraduate enrollment 1247 3112
Growth of institution type (%) 70.1
Share of type 8.1 12.5
% missing wage data refers to the percent of institu-
tions within each type for which median early career
earnings for graduates was unable to be recorded.
Average undergraduate enrollment refers to the av-
erage number of undergraduate students that at-
tend that type of institution.Growth of institution
type refers to the growth in the number of insti-
tutions reported from 2001 to 2011. Share of type
refers to the proportion of the specified type rela-
tive to the whole sample.
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only did the growth of FP institutions outpace those of NFPs, but the average
undergraduate enrollment at FP institutions also increased to over 3,000 students
per institution compared to just over 2,000 students in NFP institutions. Lastly,
observe the percent missing median wage information. With such complete
information, I am able to construct a comprehensive picture of enrollment and
completions in 4-year or above institutions with a degree granting status of
primarily baccalaureate or above.
3.2 Empirical Methodology
In this analysis, I start by creating a measure of institution quality based on the
median early-career wage for graduates from each institution. Each institution is
grouped into a ventile according to its median wage. Thus, each bin represents five
percent of the quality distribution. With bins on the left side of the scale
representing the lowest quality institutions, or those institutions with the lowest
median wages, and the bins on the right side of the scale representing the highest
quality institutions, or those with the highest median wages. For example, the 5th
ventile represents schools in the 20th to 25th percentiles, the 10th ventile
representing those in the 45th to 50th percentiles, the 15th ventile representing the
70th to 75th percentiles, and the 20th ventile representing institutions in the 95th to
100th percentile of the median wage distribution.
To capture the change in enrollment from 2001 to 2011, I employ the following
empirical strategy:













where j is the respective ventile (i.e., j = 1, 2, . . . , 20) and summing from ith to kth
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schools in the ventile. This formation is the percent change in enrollment at each
ventile, rather than by each institution. There is a distinct advantage to calculating
the growth in enrollment this way. Consider calculating the growth in enrollment in
each institution and averaging the growth for all of the institutions in each ventile.
In this way, the growth in enrollment may be embellished by small institutions. For
example, suppose an institution had an undergraduate enrollment of 100 in 2001
and 1000 in 2011. While these numbers are relatively small in magnitude, it would
show a 900 percent growth in enrollment contributing to the average institutional
growth in enrollment by ventile. By calculating the percent change in enrollment by
ventile, I reduce the sensitivity in changes in enrollment of small institutions.
Furthermore, by using a current variable for the institutional quality ranking, I
allow for the creation of institutions. For example, suppose that 10 new schools
were opened in 2004. When calculating the percent change in enrollment by ventile,
the first term in the numerator will capture these new schools and receive a value of
zero in the second numerator term and denominator. Thus, this measure allows for
new institutions created between the end points to be evaluated in the analysis.
This analysis requires two assumptions. The first being that institutions do not
dramatically increase their institution quality from 2001 to 2011. That is, a school
that was of low quality in 2001 is still of low quality in 2011. If this assumption is
violated, then the descriptive analysis does not reflect an accurate distribution of
institution quality. On the contrary, I do allow for some variation in quality from
2001 to 2011. Observe that institutions are allowed for movement within ventiles.
This assumption restricts movement across ventiles. For example, suppose
institution i was on the lower bound of ventile 1 in 2001. Over time, institution i
improves its quality through means of attracting better students, increased
instructional spending, etc. The furthest institution i can move is to the
upper-bound of ventile 1. It is unlikely that institutions are able to shift the median
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wages of their graduates sufficiently enough over this period to be placed into a
different quality ventile. Nonetheless, a robustness exercise could be preformed in
which the number of quality bins is reduced allowing for greater movement with
each percentile bin.
Assumption two requires that median wages of the institution’s graduates are a
reflective measure of institution quality. Individuals who attend college do so in
order to earn higher future wages as a result of educational advancements. This
assumption does not seem too far-fetched. The measure of quality is a reflection as
to why individuals chose to complete their education at the institution within in
each ventile. A potential way this assumption may be violated is if wages grow at
differential rates. Consider for example, an individual who attended a low quality
institution, that is one with low median early-career wages. It could be that the
individual from the low quality institution experiences greater wage growth later in
life, and enjoys wages that eventually surpass those of a graduate from a high
quality institution. In plainest terms, it may be that it requires a longer time
horizon to realize the true quality of the institution an individual attended.
Nonetheless, in terms of available institution wage data, I am restricted to the
median early-career wage data by institution. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics
for the institution quality measure including the average-median salary, percent
change in average-median salary, and the average share of individuals with no labor
earnings by institution for each ventile.
Interestingly, between the lowest five percent and the highest 95 percent of
institutions, there is over a $50,000 change in early career wages. Furthermore,
there is almost a 30 percent increase in the average-median salary in moving from
the 95th percentile to the 100th percentile. It appears there is a large and distinct
advantage to graduating from the highest quality institutions. Whether this is due
to some institution-specific characteristics, the students attending these institutions,
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Table 2: Ventile Descriptive Statistics




Ventile 2014 avg.salary ($) % change
Share with
no labor
earnings1 22,240 16.8 11 40,484 2.9 9.7
2 27,372 23.1 13.5 12 41,698 3.0 9.3
3 29,767 8.7 12.2 13 43,463 4.2 9
4 31,788 6.8 12.8 14 45,161 3.9 8.7
5 33,516 5.4 11 15 46,711 3.4 8.9
6 34,644 3.4 11.5 16 48,583 4.0 8.2
7 35,416 2.2 11.6 17 50,694 4.3 8.1
8 36,667 3.5 10.1 18 54,984 8.5 8
9 38,090 3.9 10.1 19 60,535 10.1 7.8
10 39,348 3.3 9.5 20 78,607 29.9 6.8
N=1,888. 2014 average salary is the average of the median salary for the respective ventile. %
change is average median-salary change by ventile. Share with no labor earnings is the average
share of individuals who completed a degree with no labor earnings at each institution.
or a combination of the two is beyond the scope of this paper. The average share of
individuals with no labor earnings is also quite distinct. From the lowest quality
institutions to the highest the average share with no labor earnings changes by over
ten percentage points from 16.8 percent to 6.8, respectively. Again, whether this is
due to some institution-specific characteristics, the students attending these
institutions, or a combination of the both is beyond the scope of the current
analysis; however, it seems there is some penalty, or difficulty, for individuals who
complete their education from the lowest quality institutions in finding work.
4 Empirical Analysis: Illustrating the Landscape of Higher Education
4.1 Visual analysis
In this section, I present the total change in undergraduate enrollment on the left
y-axis and 6-year undergraduate graduation rates on the right y-axis in terms of a
measure of institution quality, the median early-career salary in 2014 from
graduates of the mid 2000s at each institution. I apply a local third degree
polynomial smoothing function to enrollment and graduation rate variables. Figure
2 presents the smoothed changes in undergraduate enrollment and 6-year
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Institution Quality
Enrollment 2001 Grad. Rates
2011 Grad. Rates 95% CI
Growth spanning 2001 to 2011
This figure includes both for-profit and not-for-profit institutions (N=1,888). The x-axis ranks
institutions into ventiles according to their median early-career wage for graduates. The left y-axis
reflects the growth in enrollment at primarily baccalaureate degree granting institutions and above.
The right y-axis reflects the average graduation rate for each ventile. The solid black line reflects
enrollment growth from 2001 to 2011, and is smoothed using a third degree polynomial function.
The long-dashed red line and short-dashed green line reflect 2001 and 2011 cohort graduation rates,
respectively, and are smoothed using a third degree polynomial function.
graduation rates for all 4-year or above public, NFP, and FP institutions with a
degree granting status of primarily baccalaureate or above. Figure 3 presents the
same graph excluding FP institutions.
Figure 2 illustrates that the lowest quality institutions have captured an
extremely large share of the growth in undergraduate enrollment over this period of
rapid expansion in the for-profit sector. Specifically, for institutions in the lowest
five percent of the distribution enrollment has grown over 100 percent while for
those in the highest portion of the distribution have experienced growth in
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Institution Quality
Enrollment 2001 Grad. Rates
2011 Grad. Rates 95% CI
Growth spanning 2001 to 2011
This figure excludes for-profit institutions, and holds remaining institutions in their original bins
from Figure 2 (N=1,642). The x-axis ranks institutions into ventiles according to their median early-
career wage for graduates. The left y-axis reflects the growth in enrollment at primarily baccalaureate
degree granting institutions and above. The right y-axis reflects the average graduation rate for each
ventile. The solid black line reflects enrollment growth from 2001 to 2011, and is smoothed using a
third degree polynomial function. The long-dashed red line and short-dashed green line reflect 2001
and 2011 cohort graduation rates, respectively, and are smoothed using a third degree polynomial
function.
enrollment of just more than 10 percent. Additionally, where enrollment has been
the greatest, graduation rates have declined almost five percentage points in the
lowest quality institutions. 2011 average graduation rates by ventile have decreased
for almost the lowest 50 percent of institutions while for the highest quality
institutions, graduation rates have increased over 4 percentage points.
Figure 3 illustrates that FP institutions are driving a large share of the growth in
enrollment in the lowest portion of the institution quality distribution while having
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virtually no effect for the highest quality institutions. While the growth in the
lowest quality institutions is almost 30 percentage points higher relative to those of
the highest quality, an interesting result emerges upon the removal of the FP
institutions. Graduation rates while still having declined for the lowest quality
institutions, the point in which 2011 6-year graduation rates equal and surpass 2001
6-year graduation rates is significantly shifted to the left when FP institutions are
removed. In Figure 2, graduation rates do not equalize until almost the 50th
percentile in the distribution, while in Figure 3 this equalization occurs in the 20th
to 25th percentiles indicating that FP institutions are contributing significantly to
the decline in graduation rates.
4.2 Decomposing the Change in Enrollment and Aggregate Graduation
Rates
In this section, I decompose the aggregate change in U.S. 6-year graduation rates
from 2001 to 2011. I focus on two distinct aspects. The first component is how the
changing enrollment composition across the institution quality distribution
contributed to the aggregate change in U.S. graduation rates. The second
component is how the within institution graduation rate contributed to the
aggregate change in the U.S. graduation rates. I first complete this exercise for the
full sample of institutions and then by institution quality quartile. In the following,
I present the shift-share decomposition framework.





Where ej,t is the share of enrollment at institution j at time t and gj,t is the 6-year




































(gj,2011 − gj,2001)ej,2001︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
(5)
Where term (1) captures the change in U.S. aggregate graduation rates from 2001
to 2011 due to changing enrollment composition across the institution quality
distribution holding graduation rates fixed in 2011. Term (2) captures the change in
U.S. aggregate graduation rates from 2001 to 2011 due to the within institution
graduation rate changing holding enrollment fixed in 2001. Table 3 presents the
results of this exercise.
The first column presents the results of the shift-share decomposition exercise for
the full sample. The aggregate U.S. graduation rate increased 1.7 percentage points
from 2001 to 2011. Term (1) in the full sample, denoted by value -3.9, is interpreted
as follows: holding institution graduation rates fixed in 2011, the change in the
composition of enrollment across the institution quality distribution decreased the
aggregate U.S. graduation rate by 3.9 percentage points. While term (1)
contributed in decreasing the aggregate graduation rate over this period, term (2)
more than fully offset this decline and is interpreted as follows: holding enrollment
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Table 3: Decomposition Analysis of Aggregate Graduation Rates from 2001 to 2011
By quartile of distribution
Full sample 1 2 3 4
Panel (a): Aggregate Characteristics
2001 aggregate G.R. (%) 52.6 36.3 39.1 50.5 68
2011 aggregate G.R. (%) 54.3 30.4 41.1 55.9 72.8
Aggregate difference (PP) 1.7 -5.9 2.0 5.4 4.8
Panel (b): G.R. change due to changing enrollment composition (Term 1 in Equation 5)
Total (PP) -3.9 -9.1 -2.2 -1.1 -1.4
Total Share (%) 41.1 74.0 34.9 15.1 18.4
Panel (c): G.R. Change due to within institution g.r. rates changing (Term 2 in Equation 5)
Total (PP) 5.6 3.2 4.1 6.2 6.2
Total (%) 58.9 26.0 65.1 84.9 81.6
Panel (a) presents the aggregate graduation rates (G.R.) for 2001 and 2011 cohorts, as well as
the resulting difference from 2001 to 2011. Panel (b) isolates the change in aggregate graduation
rates due to changes in enrollment from 2001 to 2011, holding graduation rates fixed to 2011, and
reflects Term 1 in Equation 5. Panel (c) reflects the change in aggregate graduation rates as a
result of changing graduation rates (g.r.) within institutions, holding enrollment fixed to 2001, and
reflects Term 2 in Equation 5. Total (PP) indicates the total percentage point change in aggregate
graduation rates from 2001 to 2011 due to the isolated term of interest. Total share (%) indicates
how much each term contributed to the total percentage point change from 2001 to 2011. The first
column reflects the entire institution quality distribution while the remaining columns reflect the
respective quartile of the distribution.
fixed in 2001, the within institution graduation rate increased the aggregate
graduation rate from 2001 to 2011 by 5.6 percentage points. Examining the
decomposition by quartile, 74 percent of the decline in aggregate graduation rates in
quartile one were due to the changing composition of enrollment across the
institution quality distribution, while the remaining 26 percent was due to an
increase in within institution graduation rates. Observe the gradient moving from
the lowest quartile to highest quartile in these two types of changes. We see that at
the low end the changing composition contributed significantly to the decline in the
aggregate graduation rates, while at the high end changing enrollment composition
had little effect on the aggregate graduation rate. In the highest quartile, within
institution changes to the graduation rate contributed over 80 percent to the change
in the aggregate graduation rate.
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5 Conclusion
Every year the government spends billions of dollars financing higher education.
The goal of such spending is to not only enroll financially constrained students, but
to graduate these students as well. In order to critically evaluate the successes and
failures of higher education, it needs to be clear where students are enrolling, and
whether federal subsidization of higher education is efficient in realizing the returns
to a college education.With the expansion of the for-profit sector in the 2000s
students have increasingly more options on where to attend an institution of higher
education. The literature suggests there may be large penalties for attending a
for-profit college, and thus institutional quality may play an important role in
determining just how large the returns really are.
This paper documents the changing landscape of enrollment and graduation rates
across a measure of institution quality during the rapid expansion of the for-profit
sector from 2001 to 2011. My unique approach focusing on specific segments of the
institution quality distribution, rather than institutions themselves, allows me to
capture recently opened schools while also providing a consistent ranking of
institution quality over this period. I conclude this work by decomposing aggregate
graduation rates across various segments of the institution quality distribution. This
exercise accounts for how the changing enrollment composition across the landscape
of higher education contributed to the decline in aggregate rates for the lowest
quality institutions while increasing them at the highest institutions.
My first set of key results documents the significant increase in enrollment at
institutions of the lowest quality from 2001 to 2011. These institutions, primarily
composed of for-profits, grew more than 100 percent in ten years – also where
graduation rates have decreased by almost 5 percentage points. The removal of FP
institutions shifts the equalization of 2001 and 2011 cohort graduation rates almost
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5 ventiles, or 25 percentage points, higher in the institution quality distribution. At
the same time, graduation rates in the highest quality institutions have increased
almost four percentage points in the span of a decade.
Further analysis suggests that aggregate graduation rates decreased primarily as
a result of the changing enrollment landscape. 74 percent of the decline in aggregate
graduation rates of the lowest quality institutions can be explained by the changing
enrollment composition across the institution quality distribution. Alternatively , in
the highest quality institutions, aggregate graduation rates increased primarily due
to higher graduation rates within these institutions. This suggests that as
enrollment expands institutions may become more selective in who they enroll,
these institutions receive a better applicant pool, or a result of better matching
between enrollee and institution.
In the current setting, I am unable to tell whether the decline in aggregate
graduation rates is due to the institutions themselves, or the types of students they
are enrolling. It may be that these significant increases in enrollment are composed
of the lowest quality students and a majority of these enrollees are failing to
graduate because they are of “poor” learning quality. Alternatively, it could be that
these institutions do not have the resources to effectively facilitate learning and
prevent students from falling through the cracks after taking on such large increases
in enrollment. One potential exercise would be to focus on the evolving landscape of
test scores across the institution quality distribution. Intuition suggests that as the
applicant pool increases in higher education, test scores of the institutions of lowest
quality will fall over time, while the highest quality, or most selective institutions,
will enroll students who have better test scores. If we see that test scores have, in
fact, decreased in the lowest quality institutions this may suggest that the decline in
graduation rates is due to student quality rather than institution quality.
Nonetheless, these results have important implications for policy makers. In
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order to effectively distribute financial aid, it needs to be clear where it needs to go.
While previous research has documented the positive impacts of financial aid on
enrollment and persistence, less is known about financial aid impacts among the
lowest quality institutions. If students continue to enroll in these institutions and
graduate without realizing the potentially reduced labor market returns, potential
policies could redirect and inform these students of alternative options.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: DID Effects of Census Tract Splits on Neighborhood Composition
(1) (2)
% Black % White
Treatment -2.644*** 4.164***
(0.206) (0.234)
Post × Treatment 0.262*** -0.164**
(0.050) (0.067)
Mean of dep. variable 14.21% 70.94%
R2 0.228 0.259
N 456926 456926
The unit of analysis is the 2000 census tract enve-
lope (N=456,926). Coefficients are estimated from
the following regression: yict = β0 + β1postt +
β2treatmenti+β3(postt×treatmenti)+x′itθ+εict,
and have been multiplied by 100 for ease of inter-
pretation. The variable postt indicates whether y
is measured after the 2010 Decennial Census, and
treatmenti indicates whether census tract enve-
lope i receives further delineation in the 2010 Cen-
sus. Additional controls include a quadratic func-
tion in neighborhood population, city fixed effects,
and a linear time trend. Standard errors are ro-
bust and clustered to the census tract level. Esti-
mation is restricted to 2000 census tract envelopes
that have a neighborhood population of at least
2,000 residents and a city population of at least
100,000. This captures 88.7 percent of neighbor-
hoods covering 303 unique MSAs.
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Table A.2: Long-Run Impacts of Census Tract Splits on Neighborhood Composition
(1) (2)
% Black % White
Treatment 1.818*** -0.326
(0.344) (0.444)
Mean of dep. variable 9.29% 75.92%
R2 0.457 0.642
N 38,242 38,242
The unit of analysis is the original census
tract envelope (N=38,242). Coefficients are
estimated from the regression specified in
equation 3. Treatment is an indicator that
equals 1 if the unit is observed in the rela-
tive year 0 ≤ k ≤ 30, and thus reflects the
average percentage point effect over this pe-
riod. Additional controls include a quadratic
function in neighborhood population and city
fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and
clustered to the census tract envelope level.
Estimation is restricted to census tract en-
velopes that have a neighborhood population
of at least 1,200 residents.
Table A.3: Evidence of the LIHTC in Census Tract Delineation
(1) (2)
Multiple LIHTC-Funded Projects Multiple LIHTC-Funded Projects
Treatment -0.069***
(0.004)
Post × Treatment 0.016***
(0.005)
Number of splits -0.024***
(0.001)
Post × Number of splits 0.006***
(0.001)
Mean of dep. var. 64.32% 64.32%
R2 0.021 0.022
N 71708 71708
The unit of analysis is the 2000 census tract envelope and is conditional on
the envelope ever receiving an LIHTC-funded project from 2007 to 2016
(N=71,708). Coefficients are estimated from regressions specified in equa-
tions X and Y. Additional controls include a quadratic function in neighbor-
hood population, city fixed effects, and a linear time trend. The dependent
variable of interest in each column is an indicator that equals 1 if the cen-
sus tract envelope received more than 1 LIHTC-funded project. Standard
errors are robust and clustered to the census tract level.
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Appendix B
Table B.1: Microdata Characteristics
Total (Age 20 - 30)
1980 2010
Variable White Black White Black
A.Education
High school graduate 87.5% 76.3% 93.6% 86.7%
College graduate 19.7% 8.8% 31.8% 14.6%
Avg. years of schooling 14 13 15 14
B. Work and income
Idle 7.0% 16.4% 11.2% 25.9%
Earnings $28,835 $22,045 $30,316 $19,349
Usual hours worked/week 40.1 38.6 39.3 36.6
C. Social
Single mother 19.1% 54.7% 31.8% 70.3%
N 1,592,503
High school graduate in 1980 is defined as having reached 12th grade. College graduate is defined
as having completed at least 4 years of college in 1980, and is defined as having at least completed a
bachelor’s degree in 2010. Average years of schooling includes kindergarten. K-12th grade indicates
13 years of schooling. Idleness is conditional on being in the labor force, and is defined as unemployed
and not in school. Earnings data are for people who are in the labor force, not enrolled in school,
and have nonnegative earnings. Usual hours worked per week are for people who are in the labor
force and not enrolled in school. Single mother refers to females that are not currently married and
have ever had a child in 1980, and in 2010, refers to females that are not currently married and have
had a child in the last year.
90
Table B.2: City Characteristics
1980 2010
Variable Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
Population (1000s) 685.7 89.0 8275.0 836.0 98.7 9818.6
A. Race/Ethnicity
Non-Hispanic white 82.6% 31.3% 98.7% 68.4% 3.3% 95.6%
Non-Hispanic Black 10.7% 0.5% 40.9% 12.8% 0.2% 56.4%
Hispanic 4.8% 0.3% 61.9% 13.6% 1.0% 95.8%
Asian 1.2% 0.2% 59.9% 3.9% 0.6% 68.4%
B. Measures of separation
Separation by race 62.0% 30.4% 87.9% 44.1% 15.7% 76.7%
Separation by education 34.6% 18.2% 54.8% 35.3% 20.5% 53.9%
Number of neighborhoods 164 21 2,476 196 23 2,475
C. Monetary characteristics
Median home value $130,506 $74,136 $368,446 $176,053 $75,851 $730,827
Median Household income $47,735 $32,466 $78,226 $51,967 $31,881 $97,378
Median income per person $20,063 $13,954 $33,559 $25,924 $13,928 $49,744
D. Labor market characteristics
High school diploma or less 67.9% 48.3% 84.2% 42.8% 22.3% 65.5%
Unemployment rate 6.7% 2.1% 15.2% 9.4% 3.9% 16.4%
Share in manufacturing 22.7% 3.2% 51.9% 11.0% 2.0% 31.6%
Total number of cities 237 257
Separation measures are in terms of the Index of Dissimilarity. This refers to the percent of the
population that would need to move within the city in order to create an equal distribution with
respect to the specified characteristic. Neighborhoods are defined as a census tract. All monetary
variables are expressed in 2010 dollars. City is defined as the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).
Table B.3: The Relationship Between Census Tracts and Racial Separation Over
Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Racial Separation Racial Separation Racial Separation Racial Separation Racial Separation
Year (1980) (1990) (2000) (2010) (1980-2010)
Num. of census tracts 0.040** 0.036** 0.063*** 0.077*** 0.051***
(0.019) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.010)
Mean of dep. var. 62.00% 55.99% 49.11% 44.13% 52.53%
Std. dev. of dep. var. 12.29% 12.81% 13.44% 12.50% 14.42%
R2 0.188 0.160 0.222 0.195 0.137
N 237 249 276 257 1019
The dependent variable in each specification is the level of racial separation within a city and is
defined as the Index of Dissimilarity. Each specification includes a quartic function in population,
and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
Coefficients statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10% levels.
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Table B.4: Falsification Test of the Instrument
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Racial Separation Racial Separation Racial Separation Racial Separation Racial Separation
Year (1980) (1990) (2000) (2010) (1980-2010)
Num. of census tracts 0.038** 0.006 0.008 0.002 -0.003
(0.019) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Mean of dep. var. 60.93% 53.24% 47.05% 39.61% 50.59%
Std. dev. of dep. var. 12.60% 13.46% 13.69% 12.32% 15.19%
R2 0.165 0.107 0.103 0.082 0.063
N 237 231 219 208 895
The dependent variable in each specification is the level of racial separation within a city and is
defined as the Index of Dissimilarity. This measure is calculated using census tract envelopes that
were established in either 1970 or 1980. The sample includes MSAs that existed in 1980 and could be
followed to 2010. Each specification includes a quartic function in population, and standard errors
are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
Coefficients statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10% levels.
Table B.5: OLS Estimates of the Effects of Racial Separation on Economic Opportu-
nities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HS dropout College graduate ln(income) Idle Single motherhood
Separation 0.0002*** 0.0004*** 0.0008*** 0.0001*** 0.0004***
(0.0000>) (0.0000>) (0.0001) (0.0000>) (0.0002)
Black*separation 0.0014*** -0.0034*** -0.0035*** 0.0010*** 0.0051***
(0.0000>) (0.0000>) (0.0001) (0.0000>) (0.0002)
Mean of dep. var. 11.64% 22.24% $24,997.51 6.24% 31.61%
R2 0.031 0.120 0.219 0.046 0.185
N 1592503 1592503 1378543 1305801 123236
HS dropout is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual completed less than grade 12 in
1980, and in later years equals 1 if the individual completed grade 12, or less, and did not receive
a diploma. College graduate is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual completed at
least 4 years of college in 1980, and in later years equals 1 if the individual has a bachelor’s degree
or higher. Income is defined as earned income, and is conditional on being in the labor force with
nonnegative earnings. Idleness is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the individual is in the labor
force, but neither going to school nor employed. Single motherhood is an indicator that equals 1
if the female is not currently married, and has ever had a child in 1980 or 1990. In 2010 single
motherhood refers to females who are not currently married and have had a child in the last year.
Single motherhood data are not available for 2000. Separation is defined as the Index of Dissimilarity,
and the interaction term includes an indicator if the individual is Black. Individual controls include
sex, age, and educational attainment. City-level controls include population, percent Black and its
interaction, percent Hispanic, percent with a high school degree or less, percent manufacturing and
its interaction, unemployment rate, median HH income, percent married, segregation by skill level,
birth place state FE, and year and region FE. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity
and intra-MSA clustering.
Coefficients statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10% levels.
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Table B.6: Separation and Geographic and Economic Mobility in Heavily Black
Neighborhoods
Geographic Mobility Economic Mobility
















earnersSeparation -0.0249 0.1848*** 0.0211*** 0.3052***
(0.0183) (0.0596) (0.0050) (0.0267)
≥90%
Black*separation
0.0143 -0.2782*** -0.0401*** -0.2738***
(0.0270) (0.0284) (0.0020) (0.0173)
Mean of dep.
Var.
19.36% 49.16% 1.16% 21.04%
R2 0.151 0.216 0.054 0.171
N 45368 45368 45379 45379
Census tract-level data come from Opportunity Insights, and consist of data collected for individuals
born between 1978-1983. In columns (1) and (2), childhood refers to individuals up to age 23. Since
columns (1) and (2) refer to data based upon childhood census tracts, estimates are calculated using
1980 racial separation levels with the number of 1980 census tracts as the instrument, and 1980
controls. Columns (3) and (4) refer to the estimated probability of an individual in a given tract
reaching the respective percentile of the national income distribution (among children born in the
same cohort) in 2014-2015. Columns (3) and (4) are estimated using 2010 racial separation levels,
census tract count, and controls. Separation is defined as the Index of Dissimilarity, and the interac-
tion term includes an indicator if the neighborhood is greater than or equal to 90% Black. City-level
controls include population, percent Black and its interaction term, percent Hispanic, percent with
high school degree or less, percent in manufacturing and its interaction, unemployment rate, me-
dian HH income, percent married, and segregation by skill level. Standard errors are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and intra-MSA clustering.
Coefficients statistically significant at ***1%, **5%, and *10% levels.
